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Article 2

THE STUMBLING THREE-STEP, BURDEN-SHIFTING
APPROACH IN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
CASES*
Kenneth R. Davist
INTRODUCTION

In 1973, an ambitious Supreme Court decided McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green.' The case introduced an elaborate
three-stage, burden-shifting framework for disparate-treatment

employment discrimination cases. 2 Unique in design,' the approach requires that the plaintiff establish, at stage one, the
elements of a prima facie case,4 though the Court noted that
the elements would vary with the factual context.' To rebut
* @1995 Kenneth R. Davis. All Rights Reserved.
t Assistant Professor of Legal & Ethical Studies, Fordtim University School of
Business Administration; BJA., 1969, State University of New York at Binghamton;
MA., 1971, University of California at Long Beach, J.D, 1977, University of
Toledo College of Law.
3 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
SId. at 802-04.
' See Mfelissa A. Essary, The Dismantling of McDonnell Douglas v. Green: The
High Court Muddies the Evidentiary Waters in CircumstantialDiscrimination Ca es, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 385, 397 (1994) (describing McDonnell Douglas as establishing
a "unique" framework for allocating the order and burdens of proof).
I McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The four elements of a prima facie
case for the discriminatory rejection of a job applicant are: (1) the plaintiff belongs
to a protected class; (2) he applied and was qualified for an available job; (3) he
was rejected; and (4) after the rejection, the defendant continued teoking applicants with plaintiffs qualifications. Id.
IThe Court noted that 'the specification above of the prima facie proof re-

quired from respondent [n a case of a rejected job applicant] is not necessarily
applicable in every respect to differing factual situations." Id. at 802 n.13. For
example, the Eighth Circuit has held that the elements of a prima facie failuro-topromote case are: (1) the employee is a member of a protected class; (2) the employee was qualified for an available promotion; (3) the employee was rejected for
the promotion; and (4) other employees, not in the protected class, received the
promotion. Winbush v. Iowa, 66 F.3d 1471, 1480 (8th Cir. 1995). Unfortunately,
the elements of a prima facie case differ from circuit to circuit. See infra notes
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the presumption of discrimination attendant to plaintiff's proving a prima facie case, the employer must articulate, at stage
two, a nondiscriminatory reason for its conduct.' The process
concludes by focusing, at stage three, on whether the articulated reason was a pretext for discrimination.7
The Mcbonnell Douglas framework has elicited both plaudits and disapproval. Hailing the approach as a milestone in
civil rights law, supporters commend it for sensibly ordering
the proof in discrimination cases and promoting efficiency by
limiting the issues.' They praise the Supreme Court for easing
a victim's burden of proving subtle yet invidious discrimination.9 Critics fault the McDonnell Douglas approach for its

insistence on jamming facts into an inapt mold and for its
unwieldy complexity which displaces reasoned determinations
with the vagaries of befuddled jurors."0 They accuse the high

150 and 154.
' McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The Court avoided the pitfall of attempting to catalogue all potentially legitimate reasons. Id. at 802-03.
" Id. at 804. The plaintiff may prove pretext by showing that the defendant
treated people not in the protected class more favorably under similar circumstances. Id. Any prior workplace relationship between the parties is also relevant, as
are defendant's minority employment policies and practices, which may be illuminated by statistics. Id. at 804-05.
' See Teresa Clark Postle, Comment, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: Interpretation of Title Vii Takes a Wrong Turn, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 217, 225 (1993)
(commenting that the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case "eliminate[s] the most
common, legitimate reasons for an adverse employment decision"). But see Jody H.
Odell, Comment, Between Pretext Only and Pretext Plus: UnderstandingSt. Mary's
Honor Center v. Hicks and Its Application to Summary Judgment, 69 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1251, 1252 (1994) (citing commentators who fear that the decision
prevents recovery for all plaintiffs except those with direct evidence of discrimination).
9 Odell, supra note 8 at 1252 (commending "the McDonnell Douglas framework
[for] provid[ing] courts and litigants with an ordered method of determining a
crucial, yet often elusive, element of the plaintiffs case: the employer's discrminatory intent"); Matthew D. O'Leary, Note, St. Mary's v. Hicks: The Supreme Court
Restricts the Indirect Method of Proof in Title VII Claims, 13 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.
REV. 821, 824 (1994) (arguing that the "meticulous" burden-shifting approach was
needed to aid civil rights plaintiffs in circumstantial cases); L. Steven Platt,
Demystifying the RtF Defense in Discrimination Cases, 82 ILL. B.J. 209, 209 (1994)
(praising McDonnell Douglas for its "common sense," but questioning its usefulness
to reduction-in-force cases).
0 Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93
MICH. L. REv. 2229, 2301 (1995) (advocating the abandonment of the McDonnell
Douglas fi-amework because "the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine structure can impoverish courts' understanding of the evidence and decrease the likelihood that courts
will recognize the novel legal issues about the nature of discrimination that are so
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Court of usurping the role of Congress by instituting a system
of proof not rooted in Title VII and otherwise unknown to civil

1
law. '

Time is the most strident detractor of McDonnell Douglas;

this cryptic decision has caused endless confusion. Conflict
among the circuits prompted the Supreme Court in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine' to clarify the

defendant's burden of proof at stage two.' After Burdine explained that defendant's burden was merely to articulate a

nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action,
disagreement arose concerning the plaintiffs burden of proof at

stage three.'4 The issue was whether the employee was entitled to judgment by proving the employer's articulated justifi-

cation was pretextual or whether additional proof of discriminatory intent was required. In St. Mary's Honor Center v.

often presented by the evidence even in seemingly routine cares'). See also
Hannah Arterian Furnish, Formalistic Solutions to Complex Problems: The Supreme Court's Analysis of Individual Disparate Treatment Cases Under Title VIH, 6
INDUS. REL. L. 353, 372 (1984) ("McDonnell Douglas was a formalistic approach
to a complex problem-demonstrating employer intent to discriminate. Formalisti
solutions to complex issues seldom resolve them and are subject to misuse.").
I Rebuking the McDonnell Douglas Court for engaging in "an audacious and
arbitrary exercise of power," one commentator has observed. 1The Court's pronuncation of the prima facie case and the shift in burden to the employer stands
starkly naked, without the armor of Congressional support, common-law authority,
or reasoning." Mark A. Schuman, The Politics of Presumption: St. Mary's Honor
Center v. Hicks and the Burdens of Proof in Employment Discrimination Cases, 9
S. JomN's J. LEGAL COMMENT. 67, 70 (1993).
'2

450 U.S. 248 (1981).

1' Compare Texas Dep't of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine, 608 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.
1979), vacated and remanded, 450 U.S. 248 (1981); Vaughn v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 620 F.2d 655, 659 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding that the defendant bears the
burden of persuading the factfinder that its alleged legitimate reason accunted for
the contested employment decision), vacated and remanded, 450 U.S. 972 (1981),
affd 702 F.2d 137 (1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 690 (1984) and Turner v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 555 F.2d 1251, 1255-56 (6th Cir. 1977) with Lieberman v.
Gent, 630 F.2d 60, 65 (2d Cir. 1980); Ambush v. Montgomery Co. Gov't, 620 F.2d
1048, 1054 (4th Cir. 1980) and Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1011 (1st
Cir. 1979) (holding that the defendant bears only the burden of production of a
legitimate reason for the contested decision).
, Compare Tye v. Polaris Bd. of Ed., 811 F.2d 316, 320 (6th Cir. 1937) and
King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding that a plaintiff who
proves the employer's articulated reason pretextual is entitled to judgment) with
EEOC v. Flasher Co., 986 F.2d 1312, 1321 (10th Cir. 1992) and Galbraith v.
Northern Telecom, Inc., 944 F.2d 275, 283 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that a plaintiff
must prove discriminatory intent in addition to pretext), cert. denied, 503 US. 945.
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Hicks,'5 the high Court again intervened, but rather than
clarifying the law, it withdrew on tiptoe from McDonnell Douglas, cloaking its retreat in ambiguous language which has
assured continued controversy.'"
Though laudable, the Court's retreat was too halting. The
complicated, three-stage, burden-shifting scheme shifts the
burden of incomprehensibility to the jury." Recognizing this
113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
Unlike McDonnell Douglas as clarified by Burdine, which held that a plaintiff prevails by discrediting the defendant's articulated justification for its conduct,
Hicks held that the jury may, but is not obliged to, find for the plaintiff who
proves pretext. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2749. See Essary, supra note 3, at 387;
Emanuel Margolis, Human Rights Commentator, 67 CONN. B.J. 429, 433 (1993);
Donna G. Goldian, Comment, New Reason to Lie: The End of Proving Discriminatory Intent by Proving Pretext Only After St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 30
WaIAMFISrE L. REV. 699, 706 (1994); Shannon R. Joseph, Note, Employment Discrimination: Shouldering the Burden of Proof After St. Mary's Honor Center v.
Hicks, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 963, 963 (1994); O'Leary, supra note 9 at 841;
Postle, supra note 8, at 243-44; Raymond Nardo, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks
Burst Bubble in Employment Discrimination, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 9, 1993, at 1. But see
Odell, supra note 8, at 1273 (suggesting that both Hicks and McDonnell Douglas
follow the permissive standard which allows the jury, based on plaintiffs showing
of pretext, to find discriminatory intent); contra Norma G. Whitis, Note, St. Mary's
Honor Center v. Hicks: The Title VII Shifting Burden Stays Put, 25 LoY. U. CH.
L.J. 269, 292 (1994) (stating that Hicks, like McDonnell Douglas, permits, but does
not compel, the factfinder to infer intentional discrimination upon rejection of the
defendant's proffered reasons).
17 A jury charge, approved by the Seventh Circuit in a racial discrimination
case, demonstrates the complexity, if not the utter incomprehensibility, of a
McDonnell Douglas instruction. The charge informs the jury:
To prove intentional discrimination, plaintiff need not prove that his race
was the sole motivation or the primary motivation for defendant's employment decision. Also, plaintiff is not required to produce direct evidence of unlawful intent. It is not easy to prove motive directly because
there sometimes is no way to fathom or scrutinize the operations of the
human mind. Intentional discrimination, however, if it exists, is a fact
which you may infer from the existence of other facts.
With respect to each of the plaintiffs claims, in deciding whether
the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff because of
his race, you should first consider whether plaintiff has established the
following elements:
First, that George Lynch is black;
Second, that George Lynch was satisfactorily performing his job;
Third, that he was denied certain job assignments and promotional
opportunities;
Fourth, the employer, Belden, chose white persons with similar qualifications or qualifications not equal to plaintiffs to perform the jobs; and
Fifth, that George Lynch was damaged as alleged in his complaint.
If you find that plaintiff has proved each of these elements, then
18
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problem, some courts do not even instruct the jury on the
McDonnell Douglas approach, fearing that a McDonnell Douglas charge may sabotage the factfinding process by leading
jurors "to seize upon poorly understood legalisms." 8 The efficacy of a system is suspect when judges distrust the jury's
ability to understand it.
Even when applied properly, McDonnell Douglas may
defeat an otherwise meritorious civil rights claim. Elements of
the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case conflict with the mandate of the Civil Rights Act of 1991' that plaintiffs establish
a claim by proving that unlawful discrimination motivated an
adverse employment decision.' Under the 1991 Act, if a black
plaintiff has proved a prima facie case. A prima facie case means that
the plaintiff has sufficiently established his cause of action by a preponderance of the evidence and is entitled to a verdict in his favor unless
the defendant rebuts such evidence.
Thus, it then becomes your duty to determine the second issue,
namely, did the defendant introduce evidence showing that there was a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason why it did not promote or transfer
plaintiff. If your answer on the second issue is yes, that defendant has
articulated or stated his legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its failure to promote or transfer the plaintiff, then you should decide in favor
of the defendant, unless the plaintiff has also proved by a preponderance
of the evidence that the defendant's legitimate nondiscriminatory reason
is a pretext, disguising an underlying intent to discriminate on the basis
of race.
Lynch v. Belden and Co., 882 F.2d 262, 265-66 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1080 (1990). In light of Hicks, this charge might be modified to state that if
plaintiff proves pretext, the jury may, but is not compelled to find for plaintiff.
See generaly 3 HON. EDWARD J. DEVITF, ET. AL., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND
INSTRUCTIONS, CIVIL § 104.04 (4th ed. 1987 & Supp. 1995) (discussing McDonnell
Douglas jury instructions used among the circuits).
" Loeb v. Textron, 600 F.2d 1003, 1016 (1st Cir. 1979). In Lacb, the First
Circuit said:
McDonnell Douglas was not written as a prospective jury
charge; to read its technical aspects to the ... jury will add
little to the juror's understanding of the case, and even worse,
may lead jurors to abandon their own judgment and to seize
upon poorly understood legalisms to decide the ultimate question
of discrimination."
Id. Similarly, the Fourth Circuit in Mullen v. Princess Anne Volunteer Fire Co,
853 F.2d 1130, 1137 (4th Cir. 1988) criticized the district court for giving the jury
the "overly complex" McDonnell Douglas charge, but held such error not reversible.
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 is sometimes referred to as "the 1991 Act."
42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(m) (Supp. 1992). See infra notes 257-265 and accompanying text for a discussion of the conflict between the 1991 Act and McDonnell
Doglas.
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applicant for a job proves that race contributed to his rejection,
he is entitled to relief. Once he shows that race was a motivating factor, job qualifications become irrelevant. Yet, an element
of a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas is that the
applicant was qualified for the job.2
McDonnell Douglas also disadvantages defendants by depriving them of flexibility in presenting their cases. Stage two
requires defendants to articulate a legitimate reason for the
challenged conduct. Defendants, however, might prefer instead
to rely on other evidence, including statistics. McDonnell Douglas denies them this option.
Parts I and II of this Article discuss the advent of the
burden-shifting framework in McDonnell Douglas and the
refinement of that approach in Burdine.2 Part III examines
the three alternative approaches to step three developed by the
circuit courts.' First, the pretext-only rule entitles the plaintiff to relief if he proves that the employer's articulated reasons
were pretextual. Second, the permissive pretext-only rule permits, but does not compel, the factfinder to grant judgment to
the plaintiff who proves pretext. Third, the pretext-plus rule
requires the plaintiff to prove discriminatory intent in addition
to pretext. This Article analyzes Hicks in Part IV and concludes that Hicks, despite its denials, departed from McDonnell
Douglas and Burdine by replacing the pretext-only rule with
the permissive standard.24 The continuing judicial controversy, after Hicks, over whether the Court adopted the permissive
standard or the pretext-plus rule is the subject of Part V.' In
Part VI this Article explores each of the pretext rules and finds
all unsatisfactory.
Part VII of this Article criticizes the McDonnell Douglas
scheme. 7 In addition to the failure of the three pretext rules,
the Article emphasizes the constraints that the burden-shifting

1 The second element of a prima facie case is "that he [the plaintiff) applied
and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants."
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
See infra notes 29-57 and accompanying text.
s See infra notes 58-76 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 77-128 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 129-218 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 219-30 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 231-302 and accompanying text.
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framework places on litigants and the confusion it foists on
juries. It also points out the clash between the McDonnell
Douglas approach as modified by Hicks and the Civil Rights
Act of 1991. Viewing the claimed benefits of the McDonnell
Douglas approach as largely illusory, this Article finds
McDonnell Douglas superfluous in light of the motivating factor test of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. The Article concludes
by calling for the abandonment of McDonnell Douglas.' In its
place this Article urges that the courts apply to all disparatetreatment cases the practices customary in civil cases and replace the McDonnell Douglas scheme with the motivating-factor test of the 1991 Act, which merely requires a plaintiff alleging disparate treatment to prove that discriminatory intent
played a part in the adverse employment decision.
I. McDoNNELL DOUGLAS CORP. V. GREEN: THE INTRODUCTION
OF THE BURDEN-SHIFnNG FRAMEWORK

In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,' the Supreme
Court fashioned a three-step scheme establishing the order and
burdens of proof in employment discrimination cases.P Green
had worked for McDonnell Douglas for eight years as a mechanic and laboratory technician until the company, in implementing a reduction-in-force plan, laid him offi A long-time
civil rights activist, Green complained that his discharge was
racially motivated and he participated in organized protests
against the company. One such action, blocking the access road
to the company's plant, resulted in his arrest. When the company later sought to hire mechanics, Green applied and the
company rejected him. In response, he filed a civil rights action. McDonnell Douglas denied Green's accusations of discrimination, asserting that it had refused to re-employ him because
he had
engaged in illegal conduct directed against the compa1
3

ny.

The case ultimately made its way to the Supreme Court
which remanded it for a retrial.' The Court noted that "the
See infra notes 303-304 and accompanying text.
411 U.S. 792 (1973).
23 Id. at 802-04.
2

Id, at 801.
"I Green alleged two theories at the EEOC. First, he alleged that McDonnell
31
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issue at the trial on remand is framed by those opposing factual contentions [i.e., Green's charge of discrimination and
McDonnell Douglas's alleged legitimate reason for refusing to
re-hire him]."'m Rather than allowing the order and burdens of
proof at retrial to conform to procedures customarily used in
civil cases, the Court created a unique, three-step approach for
disparate-treatment cases. First, plaintiff must establish a prima facie case, a burden which plaintiff may meet by showing:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants;
(iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that,
after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications. '

Second, after the plaintiff has proven a prima facie case, the
burden shifts to the defendant "to articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection."'
Third, once the defendant meets its burden, the plaintiff must
"be afforded a fair opportunity to show that [plaintiff s] stated
reason for [defendant's] rejection was in fact a pretext."36
Summarizing its holding, the court said: "On retrial respondent must be given a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate
by competent evidence that the presumptively valid reasons for
his rejection were in fact a coverup for a racially discriminatory decision."37
Douglas had violated § 704(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which forbids employment discrimination in retaliation for protests against discriminatory working
conditions. Second, he alleged that the company had violated § 703(a)(1) of the
1964 Act which prohibits discrimination in any employment decision. Id. at 796.
The EEOC found reasonable cause to believe that McDonnell Douglas had violated
§ 704(a) but made no such finding as to § 703(a)(1). Id. at 797. Green thereafter
filed a complaint in district court which ultimately found for the company on the §
704 claim because the company had refused to rehire him for a legitimate reason,
his illegal protest activity. In addition, the court dismissed the § 703(a)(1) claim
based on the EEOC's failure to find probable cause. Id. The Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit reversed the dismissal, id., a determination which the Supreme
Court aTirmed. Id. at 798. In remanding the case for retrial on the § 703(a)(1)
claim, the Court established the three-step burden-shifting approach. Id. at 802.04.
3
Id. at 801.
' McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. The Court added that the elements of
a prima facie case may vary with differing factual contexts. Id.
6 Id.
at 802.
so Id.
31

Id. at 805.
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McDonnell Douglas spawned uncertainty throughout the
federal judiciary. The second step of the McDonnell Douglas
framework was a particular source of confusion. Despite the
Court's pronouncement that the employer's burden of proof
was merely to articulate a legitimate reason for the challenged
action,. some courts erroneously required the defendant to
prove the legitimacy of its conduct by a preponderance of evidence.' In Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine
the Supreme Court not only allayed this confusion but also
supplemented McDonnell Douglas by articulating the rationale
for its three-step approach. Unfortunately, Burdine engendered
controversy as to the third step of McDonnell Douglas'
II. TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY AFFAIRS V. BURDINE:
THE REFINEMENT OF MCDONNELL DOUGLAS

Burdine, a woman, worked for the Public Services Careers
Division of the Texas Department of Community Affairs, first
as an accounting clerk and later as a field services coordinator.
Critical of the Division's inefficiencies, the Department threatened to abolish the Division unless it reorganized its staff and
appointed a project director. The directorship went to a man,
and Burdine, who had applied for the position, was fired. Alleging gender discrimination, Burdine sued the Department for
failing to promote her and for firing her.
After a bench trial, the district court found that the Department had refused to promote Burdine and had fired her for
legitimate business reasons rather than for gender-bias. The
Fifth Circuit reversed as to the firing, holding that the Department, having failed to substantiate its reasons by a preponder-

"Some found the Courts articulation of the defendant's burden at stage-two
unclear. See Arterian Furnish, supra note 10, at 357 (accusing the Court of lacking clarity when it said that the employer's explanation "auffice[d] to discharge
rits] burden of proof').
E.g., Vaughn v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 620 F2a 655 (8th Cir. 1930),
vacated and remanded 450 U.S. 972 (1981); Whiting v. Jackson St. Uni7v., 616
F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1980).
450 U.S. 248 (1981).
"See infra notes 42-57 and accompanying text.
"The Department rehired Burdine and assigned her to another division where
she was paid at the same rate as the project director. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 25L
'Id. at 251.
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ance 44of evidence, had not rebutted Burdine's prima facie
case.

Holding that the circuit court had misconstrued the
defendant's burden of proof,45 the Supreme Court explained
why it had established the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
approach46 and how the approach was supposed to function. It
began by noting that McDonnell Douglas "eliminates the most
common nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiffs rejecT 7 A prima facie case creates a presumption of discrimition.'
nation, which, if not rebutted, results in judgment for plaintiff.48 To rebut the presumption, the defendant does not carry

the burden of persuasion; it must merely produce admissible
evidence that it acted for a legitimate reason.49 Once the defendant rebuts the presumption, "the factual inquiry proceeds

" Id. at 252. The Fifth Circuit nfFirmed the district court's determination that
the firing was not discriminatory. It held the lower courts "implicit evidentiary
finding" that the man hired as Project Director was better qualified than Burdine
not clearly erroneous. Id.
' Id. at 256-57. The Supreme Court assigned error also to the Fifth's Circuit's
requirement that the defendant prove the person hired or promoted was more
qualified than plaintiff. It noted that Title VII does not demand that employers
afford minorities or women preferential treatment; nor does it seek to trample on
"traditional management prerogatives." Id. at 259 (citing Steelworkers v. Weber,
443 U.S. 193, 205-06 (1979)). The Fifth Circuit would have compelled employers to
hire minorities and women as qualified as white male applicants, a preference
inconsistent with Title VII. Id. See also McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing
Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 886 (1995) (noting that "[tjhe ADEA, like Title VII, is not a
general regulation of the workplace but a law which prohibits discrimination"); see
generally Kenneth R. Davis, The After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine: A Dubious Defense in Employment Discrimination Cases, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 365, 403 (1995) (discussing how the Supreme Court in McKennon balanced employer prerogatives with
the policy to eradicate discrimination).
se McDonnell Douglas failed to explain why it established the three-step approach. The first explanation of this approach came in Furnco Construction Corp.
v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) wherein the Court said:
The McDonnell Douglas method is "a sensible, orderly way to evaluate
the evidence in light of common experience as it bears on the critical
question of discrimination.... [Wie know from our experience that more
often than not people do not act in a totally arbitrary manner, without
any underlying reasons, especially in a business setting. Thus, when all
legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant have been eliminated as
possible reasons for the employer's actions, it is more likely than not the
employer, who [sic] we generally assume acts only with some reason,
based his decision on an impermissible consideration such as race."
,7Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254.
4sId.

"

Id. at 255.
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to a new level of specificity.' 0 By meeting its burden of production, the defendant "frame[s] the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext.""' The plaintiffs burden of
proving pretext "merges with the ultimate burden of
persuad[ing] the court that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination."52 The Court then explained how a
plaintiff may satisfy his or her ultimate burden of proof: "She
may succeed in this either directly by persuading the court
that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence."'
The Court responded to the criticism that the meager
burden of production put on the defendant might unduly hinder the plaintiff. It noted that the defendant's alleged legitimate reason must be clear and specific and that, regardless of
the formal burden of proof, the defendant will be inclined, as a
tactical matter, to endeavor to persuade the trier of fact that
its explanation is bona fide.' Adding that access to the
EEOC's investigatory files will aid the plaintiff," the Court
concluded:
Given these factors, we are unpersuaded that the plaintiff will find
it particularly difficult to prove that a proffered explanation lacking
a factual basis is a pretext. We remain confident that the McDonnell
Douglas framework permits the plaintiff meriting relief to demonstrate intentional discrimination.!'
Burdine succeeded in clarifying the defendant's burden of
proof at the second stage of the McDonnell Douglas format.
However, it muddled what the plaintiff must show at stage
three. Floundering in Burdine's ambiguity, courts extracted
three meanings."

601&
I&, at 255-56.
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
Id. at 256. See also U.S. Postal Serv. v. Aikens, 460 US. 711, 717 (1983)
(holding that indiredc evidence of discrimination may suffica to meet plaintiffs
burden to prove pretext for discrimination).
"Burdine, 450 U.S. at 258.
Id,
"See infra notes 58-76 and accompanying text.
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THREE APPROACHES TO PRETEXT

A. Pretext Plus
Some courts interpreted Burdine to hold that proving
pretext is not enough for the plaintiff to prevail.' Under this
"pretext-plus" position, even if the plaintiff disproves the
defendant's contention that the adverse action occurred because of the articulated legitimate reason, the court will grant
the plaintiff judgment only if it provides additional evidence of
discrimination.59
The least favorable to plaintiffs of the three interpretations of Burdine, the pretext-plus position does not follow reasonably from the Supreme Court's instruction that a plaintiff
may prevail at step three either by offering direct evidence of
discrimination or by proving pretext. 0 Burdine at least permits (and probably compels) the trier of fact to find for the
plaintiff who proves pretext but does not furnish additional
evidence of discrimination. This inconsistency with Burdine"1
and the formidable evidentiary burden that pretext-plus imposes on plaintiffs have led many to criticize this rule.62
' See, e.g., EEOC v. Flasher Co., 986 F.2d 1312, 1821 (10th Cir. 1992) (citing
Galbraith v. Northern Telecom, Inc., 944 F.2d 275, 279 (6th Cir. 1991) approvingly
and noting that "even a finding that the reason given for the discipline was
pretextual, does not compel such a conclusion, unless it is shown to be a pretext
for discrimination against a protected class"); Galbraith, 944 F.2d at 283 (stating
that "we are faced with a situation in which proving that an employer's proffered
reason for discharging an employee is a pretext does not establish that it is a
pretext for racial discrimination"); Lopez v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 930 F.2d
157, 161 (2d Cir.) (stating that "[ut is not enough for the plaintiff to show that
the articulated reasons were not the true reasons defendant's actions") (quoting
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256), cert. denied 502 U.S. 880 (1991); Holder v. City of Raleigh, 867 F.2d 823, 827 (4th Cir. 1989) (concluding that "the magistrate's finding
that the defendants' proffered reasons may have been themselves pretextual [does
not] prove plaintiffs case of racial discrimination); Clark v. Huntsville Bd. of Ed.,
717 F.2d 525, 529 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that "a simple finding that the defendant did not truly rely on its proffered reason, without a further finding that the
defendant relied instead on race, will not suffice to establish Title VII liability").
See supra note 58.
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
61 See Postle, supra note 8, at 227-28.
" One critic of the pretext plus rule has argued: "Not only does the rule unduly handicap employees by requiring 'plus' evidence, but application of the rule to
reject most of the common forms of 'plus' evidence that plaintiffs produce further
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B. Permissive Pretext Only
A few courts interpreted Burdine to mean that, if the

plaintiff establishes that the defendant's alleged legitimate
reason was a pretext, the trier of fact is permitted, but is not
compelled, to render judgment for the plaintifE' Thus, if the

plaintiff at stage three establishes that the defendant's alleged
legitimate reason did not motivate defendant but the plaintiff
produces no further evidence of discrimination, the trier of fact
may, in its discretion, find either for the plaintiff or the defendant.
More favorable to the plaintiff than the pretext-plus position, this "permissive pretext-only" standard allows, but does
not require, a finding of discrimination based solely on a
plaintiff's showing of pretext. Some favor this rule because it
balance of the interests of employee
"represents a reasonable
4
employer."
and

hampers" plaintiffs' cases. Catherine J. Lancot, The Defendant Lies and the Plaintiff Loses: The Fallacy of the ?retext-Plus" Rule in Employment Diccrimination
Cases, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 57, 140-41 (1991). See also Essary, supra note 3, at 405

(arguing that the pretext-plus rule has proven "almost insurmountable' for most
plaintiffs, even when they present credible evidence from which the trier of fact
could infer discrimination).
I See, e.g., Samuels v. Raytheon Corp., 934 F.2d 388, 392 (1st Cir. 1991)
(holding that "[elven assuming the original prima facie case plus the evidence of
pretext suffices to raise a reasonable inference of discrimination, this does not
automatically entitle the plaintiff to judgment"); Benzies v. flinois Dep't of Montal
Health and Developmental Disabilities, 810 F.2d 146, 148 (7th Cir. 1937) (noting
that "[a] demonstration that the employer has offered a spurious explanation is
strong evidence of discriminatory intent, but it does not compel such an inference
as a matter of law"), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1006 (1987).
"Robert C. Cadle, Burdens of Prooft Presumption and Pretext in Disparate
Treatmen Emploment Discrimination Cases, 78 MASS. L. REV. 122, 131 (1993)
(citation omitted). See also Richard A. Samp, Intent I Needed for Worhplyze Bids,
NATL L.J., June 14, 1993, at 15 (agreeing with the permissive standard because
false explanations do not always signal discrimination, such as where the employer
fires a worker in violation of a labor agreement and conceals this reason at a
discrimination trial); Whitis, supra note 16, at 298 (concluding that 'the St. Mwry
majority [which adopted the permissive standard] both correctly interpretedexisting precedent and properly followed the Federal Rule of Evidence [Rule 301] that
governs presumptions in civil proceedings'). But see Margolis, cupra note 16, at
433 (criticizing the permissive rule as "unfair at worst and extremely cumborsomo
at best" and predicting that the implementation of the permissive rule will cause
"longer trials and more pro-trial discovery' and "increased expnms and delay').
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C. Pretext Only
The third interpretation of Burdine, predominant among
courts that have decided the issue, is known as the "pretextonly" position.65 This view holds that, if a plaintiff proves that
the defendant's alleged legitimate reason is a pretext, the
plaintiff is entitled to judgment. To prevail, the plaintiff need
establish only that the alleged legitimate reason did not motivate the defendant. No additional evidence of discrimination is
required. Of the three positions, pretext-only is most favorable

to plaintiffs. This alternative has evoked substantial support
from commentators 66 who stress that "pretext only" follows
from the purpose of the three-stage McDonnell Douglas framework, which is to narrow the issues.67 They also argue that an
employer caught in a pretext is probably hiding discrimination.6

Caban-Wheeler v. Elsea, 904 F.2d 1549, 1554 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that,
by proving pretext, "the plaintiff satisfies the required ultimate burden of demonstrating . . . intentional racial discrimination") (citations omitted); Tyoe v. Board of
Educ., 811 F.2d 315, 317 (6th Cir. 1987) (citations omitted) (explaining that "[ijf
the defendant carries this burden [at stage two], then the plaintiff must show that
the defendant's stated reason was pretextual"), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 924 (1987);
King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d 878, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (ruling that when the plaintiff
"discredits the defendants' purported explanation, she has carried her ultimate
burden"); Thornbrough v. Columbus and Greenville R.R., 760 F.2d 633, 646 (5th
Cir. 1985) (citations omitted) (reading Burdine to hold that at stege three "the
burden reverts to the plaintiff to prove that the employer's reasons are
pretextual"); Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1321 (8th Cir. 1985) (stating in dictum
that "[Uf the plaintiff shows the defendant's proffered reason to be a pretext for
race, the case is over"); Duffy v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 738 F.2d 1393,
1396 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding that "a showing that a proffered justification is
pretextual is itself equivalent to a finding that the employer intentionally discriminated"), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1087 (1984).
" See, e.g., Postle, supra note 8, at 244 (refuting the argument that by requiring the plaintiff to disprove the employer's articulated reason, the burden of persuasion is shifted to the defendant in violation of Federal Rule of Evidence 301).
" See Goldian, supra note 16, at 714-15 (arguing that the third stage of
McDonnell Douglas, which supposedly limits the issues, is meaningless unless the
plaintiff prevails by proving pretext); Oeary, supra note 9, at 844-46 (supporting
the pretext only rule because it narrows the issues at stage three allowing the
victim of subtle discrimination to prevail).
" Robert Brookins, Hicks, Lies, and Ideology: The Wages of Sin Is Now Exculpation, 28 CREIGHTON L. REv. 939, 989 (1995) (arguing that if the employer's
justification for the challenged action is shown at trial to be false, the factfinder
should infer discrimination); Odell, supra note 8, at 1258-59 (asserting that dis.
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D. Burdine Adopts Pretext Only
Although Burdine is not free from ambiguity, the opinion
points most convincingly to the pretext-only rule. Once the
defendant articulates a legitimate reason for its conduct, the
Court tells us that the factual inquiry rises to "a new level of
specificity," 9 suggesting that the issue narrows to whether
the plaintiff can prove pretext. Reinforcing this interpretation,
the Burdine Court comments that, in meeting its burden of
production at stage two, the defendant "frame[s] the factual
issue with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full
and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext" After noting
that the plaintiffs burden at stage three is to prove that the
defendant's articulated, legitimate reasons were a "pretext for
discrimination," the Court emphasizes that it is the plaintiffs
ultimate burden to prove intentional discrimination and that
the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting fiamework "bring[s]
the litigants and the court expeditiously and fairly to this
ultimate question." The Court seems to be saying that, at
stage three of McDonnell Douglas, proving pretext is inseparable from proving discrimination. It underscores this unity by
stating that the burden of proving pretext "merges with the
ultimate burden of persuading the court that [the plaintiff] has
been the victim of intentional discrimination."72
The quoted passages suggest that the Court intended to
establish the pretext-only rule. 3 Unfortunately, the Court
injected ambiguity into its opinion when it declared that a
plaintiff may succeed either by direct evidence of discrimination or by proving pretext. 4 One may construe this statement
to support the permissive pretext-only position, because the
statement suggests that the trier of fact may but is not com-

crediting the employer's articulated reason strongly implies discrimination).
' Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255.
0 Id. at 255-56.
7Id1 at 253.
72

Id.

at 256.

See Lanctot, supra note 62, at 119 (arguing that the %nerger" lnngunge in
Burdine implies the Court's adoption of the pretext-only rule).
1

7"

See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
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pelled to hold for the plaintiff who proves pretext."' One may,
however, read the statement to support the pretext-only position; the statement may mean that a plaintiff who proves pretext is entitled to judgment and that a plaintiff who cannot
prove pretext must rely on direct evidence of discrimination. 6
In light of the entire opinion, the pretext-only interpretation
appears correct.
IV. ST. MARY'S HONOR CENTER V. HICKS" AN ATrEMPT TO
END THE CONFUSION

Because of conflicting interpretations of McDonnell Douglas and Burdine, federal civil rights law might have vindicated
a plaintiffs claim in one circuit while denying an essentially
identical claim in another. To achieve uniformity, the Supreme
Court, in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,"8 sought to clarify
its prior decisions.
A. The Facts and ProceduralHistory
St. Mary's Honor Center, a half-way house, employed
Hicks, a black man, as a correctional officer and later promoted him to shift commander. After the installation of a new
supervisory team, Hicks, who had a satisfactory employment
record, became the subject of escalating disciplinary action
which culminated in his dismissal. Alleging racial discrimination, Hicks commenced a civil rights action. 9 Although Hicks
proved at trial that St. Mary's articulated reasons for firing
him were pretextual, the district court, following the pretextplus position, granted judgment to St. Mary's because Hicks
had failed to satisfy his burden that the firing was racially

See Schuman, supra note 11, at 80.
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, conceded that "[w]e must agree with
the dissent on this one: The words bear no other meaning but that the falsity of
the employer's explanation is alone enough to compel judgment for the plaintiff."
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2552 (1993).
"

16

7 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
78 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).

7' Id.
at 2746. Hicks alleged employment discrimination in violation of both §
703(a)(1) of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 which forbids discrimination under
color of state law. Id.
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motivated."0 The district court concluded that St. Mary's
might have discharged Hicks out of personal rather than racial
aninmus.8

The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that, because Hicks
had proven pretext, he was entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.' Favoring the pretext-only position, it reasoned that,
once Hicks had discredited St. Mary's alleged justifications for
firing him, St. Mary's should have been in no better position
than if it had offered no explanation at all. Since the failure
to rebut the presumption of discrimination by articulating a
"legitimate" reason results in judgment for plaintiff; the court
concluded that the same result should follow when the plaintiff
disproves the alleged legitimate reason."
B. The Majority Opinion
Writing for a five-justice majority, Justice Scalia labored to
harmonize the Hicks opinion with Burdine, but his efforts were
unavailing. Despite his denials, he led the Court in a new
direction.'
1. The Holding
The majority disagreed with the circuit court' and adopted the permissive pretext-only approach.' The Court held:
The factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of a prima fade case, suffice
to show intentional discrimination. Thus, rejection of the defendant's

proffered reasons, will permit the trier of fact to infer the ultimate
fact of intentional discrimination.... But the Court of Appeals
[erred in] holding that rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons

SId,
92

at 2748.

Id-

Hicks, 113 S. 6t. at 2748.
See id. at 2748.
s See Margolis, supra note 16, at 433-34 (arguing that Hks is incompatible
with McDomzel Douglas which established the pretext only rule); cce alco O'leary
supra note 9, at 842.
Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2746.
See id. at 2749.
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compels judgment for the plaintiff.'

To support this approach, the Court proposed a hypothetical which, in its view, demonstrated the folly of the pretextonly standard. In the hypothetical, a company hires a
disproportionately higher percentage of blacks than that occurring in the relevant labor market. The company's black hiring
officer rejects a minimally qualified black applicant, who sues
under Title VII. Before the court hears the suit, the company
fires the hiring officer, who, now antagonistic to the company,
refuses to cooperate with its efforts to establish the legitimate
reason for not hiring the black applicant. Unassisted by the
discharged hiring officer, the company attempts, perhaps unsuccessfully, to piece together the reason for the hiring officer's
rejection of the applicant. Under the pretext-only approach, if
the jury finds the company's alleged reason for not hiring the
plaintiff unpersuasive, the jury must find for the plaintiff even
if it does not believe that the company was guilty of racial
discrimination.8 9 Citing this hypothetical, the Court concluded
that the pretext-only approach may compel the jury to find for
a plaintiff, despite evidence convincing the jury that the defendant did not discriminate. 0
2. The Dissection of Burdine
Asserting that it was following Burdine, the Hicks Court
analyzed Burdine sentence by sentence.9' The Court pointed
out that Burdine requires the plaintiff to prove at stage three
that the defendant's alleged legitimate reasons were a "pretext
for discrimination."" The plaintiff must show "both that the
reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason."93 According to the majority, later allusions to "pretext"

Id.
Id. at 2750-51.
10 Id. at 2751.

,"See Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2751-53. It performed this task "grudgingly," objecting to dissecting the sentences in decisions as if they were clauses in statutes.
Nevertheless, the Court felt compelled to scrutinize the language of Burdine to
rebut Justice Souters dissenting opinion in which Justices White, Blackmun and
Stevens joined. Id. at 2751.
' Id. at 2752 (citing McDonnell Douglas, 450 U.S. at 253).
93Id.
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in Burdine refer to the previously described "pretext for discrimination.' However, Justice Souter, writing for a fourjustice dissent, observed that the majority's pronouncement
that a plaintiff must prove pretext and discrimination-an
endorsement of the pretext-plus rule-contradicts the
majority's statement that the jury is permitted, but is not compelled, to hold for the plaintiff who shows pretext-an endorsement of the permissive pretext-only rule.95
Although the majority opinion suffers from murky language, 6 it is possible to reconcile the apparently conflicting
statements. The majority adopted the permissive pretext-only
rule in unequivocal language. Its statement that the plaintiff
must prove both pretext and discrimination does not deny the
possibility that proving pretext may also prove discrimination.
If the finder of fact determines that plaintiff's proof of pretext
simultaneously proves discriminatory intent, the plaintiff will
win. If those facts, standing alone, do not satisfy the factflnder
that the defendant discriminated, the plaintiff will have to
submit additional proof to prevail.
Continuing with its "dissection" of Burdine, the Hicks
majority interpreted Burdine's statement that at stage three
"the factual inquiry proceeds to a new level of specificity' 7 to
mean that a case at that juncture turns to proofs and rebuttals

" I&
" Id. at 2762.
See Cadle, supra note 64, at 130 (agreeing with the dissent that the "majori-

ty gives 'conflicting signals' about the scope of its holding (citing Hicks, 113 S. Ct
at 2762 (Souter, J., dissenting))); see also Odell, supra note 8, at 1267. Most writ-

ers correctly construe Hicks to adopt the permissive standard. See, eg., Joe Keith
Windle, Comment, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: Is the Supreme Courts Deflinition of Pretext Beneficial or Detrimental to Title VI Plaintiffs?, 18 AM. J. TRIAL
ADvoC. 213, 224-27 (1994) (analyzing cases differing on whether the defendant is
entitled to summary judgment if the plaintiff does not offer proof of disimination
in addition to evidence of pretext, and concluding that summary judgment should
not be awarded under such circumstances); see also Joseph, supra note 16, at 990-

9L Some, however, extract the pretext-plus standard from Htcks. See, eg., Patrick
M. Edwards, Note, Civil Rights-Title VI Employment Discrimination-Proofof
Employer Pretext Does Not Entitle Employe to a Decision Without FurtherProofof
Discrimination. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993), 71 U.
DET. MERCY L. REV. 693, 708 (1994) (lamenting that "the jury or judga will normally be left without direct evidence of discrimination, and under direction from
H ias, must rule in favor of the defendant').

I Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2752 (citing Burdine, 450 US. at 255).
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of discriminatory motivation." The dissent, however, interpreted this language in Burdine to mean that the factual inquiry at stage three reduces to whether the defendant's alleged
reasons were pretextual.99 The dissent has the more persuasive view because the description of stage three as requiring "a
new level of specificity" implies a narrowing rather than a
broadening of focus.
The majority then considered the next sentence in
Burdine, which says, 'Placing the burden of production on the
defendant thus serves... to frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext."' 0 Undaunted by this problematic language, the majority asserted feebly that "the requirement that the employer 'clearly set forth' its reasons,
gives the plaintiff a 'full and fair' rebuttal opportunity."10 1
Consistent in its misreading of Burdine, the Hicks majority
posited that "proving the employer's reason false becomes part
of (and often considerably assists) the greater enterprise of
proving2 that the real reason was intentional discrimina10
tion."
Despite the majority's brave denials, the above-quoted
sentence from Burdine demonstrates that under that case the
issues of pretext and discriminatory intent are inseparable. As
the dissent recognized, Burdine's statement that plaintiffs
burden of proving pretext "merges" with the burden of proving
intentional discrimination supports this view.' 3
As if exhausted by its energetic reasoning, the Hicks majority concluded its analysis of Burdine with the unexpected
concession that it was unable to explain the passage in
Burdine asserting that the plaintiff may prevail "either directly
by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more
likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing that the
04
employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence."
Characterizing this language as dictum, the majority dismissed
"Id.
" Id.

at 2759.

Id. at 2752 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56).
"o Id. (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255).
2 Hicks, 113 S. Ot. at 2752.
Id. at 2760 (Souter, J., dissenting).
"' Id. at 2752 (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256).
"'
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it as contrary to the letter and spirit of Burdine and
McDonnell Douglas, and argued that, despite this concession,
its view harmonized more perfectly with Burdine than did the
dissent's view."' Ironically, Burdine's ambiguous language
should not have troubled the majority. The quotation is compatible with the permissive pretext-only rule, the approach
which the majority apparently adopted, for the language may
fairly be interpreted to mean that the factfinder may, but is
not compelled to, find for the plaintiff who proves pretext.'
3. Practical Consequences
When the Court turned to practical consequences of its
decision, it criticized the dissent's observation that an alleged
legitimate reason exposed as a pretext is necessarily a lie."
The Court explained that a corporation defending against
charges of discrimination may rely on the explanation of a
relatively low-level employee. Thus, one should not attribute
dishonesty to the employer merely because the jury disbelieves
the explanation.' Even when the employer lies, the Court
would not require a finding for the employee, since an employer may lie without having discriminated."
Addressing the argument that articulating a lie should not
put the employer in a position better than the one in which it
would have been had it remained silent, the Court cited other
instances where rebutting a presumption, even deceitfully,

11 Id. at 2752-53. Claiming to show conclusive support for its position, the
majority quoted United States Postal Service Board of Governors u. AMena, 460
U.S. 711, 714 (1983), which says, "the ultimate question [is] discrimination vel
non." At stage three, "[t]he District Court was ... in a position to decide ...
whether the defendant discriminated againd the plaintiff." Id. at 715. These ambiguous quotes from Aikens did not sway the dissent. Hicks, 113 S. Ct at 2765.
"' See Schuman, supra note 11, at 80 (arguing that Justice Scalia's "surrender'
on this point was "mistaken and unnecessary," because the quoted language says
that the plaintiff may rather than must prevail by establishing pretext).
Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2754.
us~I&.

2" Id. The Court noted that lying, either by the plaintiff or defendant, at any
other stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework does not automatically compel an
adverse judgment. Therefore, the Court concluded, it is inconsistent to require
judgment against an employer who utters this particular kind of lie. Id. at 275455.

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61: 703

enhances a litigant's position."' For example, untruthfully
denying the material allegations of a complaint avoids default."' Accordingly, the Court asserted that a dishonest employer should not be punished with an adverse judgment
where the record does not support a finding of discrimination."
Rule 11 sanctions appropriately penalize the perjur3
er."

C. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Souter wrote the dissenting opinion, asserting that
the McDonnell Douglas approach provides a fair method of
resolving the issue" of discrimination given that most civil
rights violators do not announce their discriminatory intent."5 Souter charged the majority with shackling the plaintiff with the "amorphous requirement of disproving all possible
non-discriminatory reasons that a factflnder might find lurking
in the record.""' Allowing the jury to search the record for
justifications of the employer's conduct subverts the purpose of
the second stage of McDonnell Douglas, which is to limit the
inquiry of why the employer engaged in the challenged conduct." Justice Souter rightly accused the majority of transforming the employer's burden to articulate a legitimate reason
for its conduct into a "useless ritual.""
uo Id. at 2755.
u" Id. (citing FED. R. CIrv. P. 55(a)). Similarly, an affidavit containing a lie may

avoid summary judgment. Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)).
2
'
"
"

Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2755-56.
Id. at 2755.

Id. at 2758. Justices White, Blackmun, and Stevens joined in the dissent.
Id. at 2762. See also United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens,

460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983).
u1 Id. at 2762 (Souter, J., dissenting).
u' See Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2759-61.
u' Id, at 2761. Essary argues that Hicks has emasculated McDonnell Douglas
by negating the issue-narrowing function of stage two. In her view, all the proco.

dural machinations of McDonnell Douglas lead nowhere if, in the final analysis,
the factfinder applies the ordinary civil model to resolve the ultimate issue. She
therefore questions the perpetuation of the McDonnell Douglas framework. Essary,
supra note 3, at 423. Essary is right. The Court should abandon McDonnell

Douglas not simply because Hicks has undermined the burden-shifting framework
but more significantly because the motivating factor test of the 1991 Act is the
superior and legally appropriate standard. See infra notes 232-93 and accompany-

ing text.
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Responding to the majority's argument that, as in any civil
case, the factfinder should be able to consider the entire trial
record regardless of what reasons were "officially" articulated," 9 Justice Souter rejoined that the very means of articulating a legitimate reason is through the introduction of "testimony or other admissible evidence."' This exchange suggests that the difference between the majority and dissent on
this point is merely semantic. Both would allow the factfinder
to consider any evidence in the record, regardless of what reasons were "formally" articulated."2
Justice Souter argued also that, as a matter of common
sense, an employer relying on a pretext most likely discriminated.' An employer with a legitimate explanation for its
actions will probably assert it. Although conceding that an
employer might conceal a nondiscriminatory reason that would
prove embarrassing, Justice Souter asserted that an employer
must bear the consequences of its deceit.'
Reproaching the majority for saddling plaintiffs with an
unfair burden of proof, Justice Souter foresaw that the Hicks
holding would frustrate the policies of Title VIEL' Confronted with the specter of "unarticulated" reasons "lurking in the
record, " s plaintiffs with worthy claims might go down to defeat or not sue at all.' Justice Souter predicted also that the
majority rule ' would cause longer trials, more pretrial dis- Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2755.
21 Id, at 2759 n.3.
" Most writers, however, see a significant difference between the two po3ions,
arguing that the "lurking problem will haunt plaintiffs. See Victoria A. Cundiff &
Ann E. Chaitovitz, St. Marys Honor Center v. Hicks: Lots of Sound and Fury, but
What Does It S4gnify, 19 ELP. RFL. L., 143, 159 (1993-94) (deploring the rule
which encourages the jury to "keep digging" for legitimate reasons to justify the
employef's conduct thereby rewarding employers who have "given false evidence');
Essary, supra note 3, at 417 (faulting the majority for requiring the plaintiff to
"disprove all other reasons suggested, no matter how vaguely, in the record7 (citing Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2756)); O'eary, supra note 9, at 846 (stating that under
Hicks a plaintiff may lose unfairly "if the court scans the record and comes up
with a legitimate, yet unarticulated, reason"); Postle, supra note 8, at 243 (arguing
that under Hicks a defendant can avoid liability based on "wholly unarticulated
reason?).
2 Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2762-63.
223 Id.
at 2763.
n24Id,
125Id, at 2762.
"' Id.

at 2763.

The dissent complained also that the majority's holding is ambiguous. Parts
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covery and increased expense and delay.'
D. The Fundamental Question
The possibility of explanations "lurking in the record"
arises in all civil suits. Generally, parties to civil cases submit
their evidence and the jury sifts through the record to decide
the controversy. The burden-shifting machinations of the
McDonnell Douglas approach depart from customary practice.
While the dissenters correctly interpreted McDonnell Douglas
and Burdine, the majority arrived at a more defensible conclusion because it granted to juries more latitude in weighing the
evidence. The permissive standard adopted by the majority,
however, does not guide the jury in determining when pretext
alone is sufficient to prove discriminatory intent. The failings
of both rules raise the more fundamental question of whether
the McDonnell Douglas approach should be retained in any
form.
V. THE AFTERMATH OF Hicms
As the dissent warned, the ambiguity in Hicks has spurred
continued division among federal courts."2 Though most read

of the majority opinion seem to adopt the permissive pretext-only approach, while
other parts seem to adopt the pretext-plus approach. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2762.
The dissent's confusion notwithstanding, a fair reading of the majority opinion
favors the view that it adopted the permissive pretext-plus approach.
" Id. at 2762. Some agree with the dissent that Hicks will cause plaintifi,
wary of late-surfacing unarticulated reasons, to intensify their approach to pro-trial
disclosure. See, e.g., Joseph, supra note 16, at 991; Margolis, supra note 16, at
435. But see Essary, supra note 3, at 425 (arguing that Hicks will not change
discovery practice in discrimination cases because, in any event, most plaintiffs
conduct extensive discovery).
12 See infra notes 130-218 and accompanying text. In response to Hicks, Senator Howard Metzenbaum sponsored the Civil Rights Standards Restoration Act,
which would have reestablished the pretext-only rule. S. 1776, 103rd Cong., 1st
Sess. (1993). Section 4(a) provides in part:
Standards.-In a case or proceeding brought under federal law in which
a complaining party meets its burden of proving a prima facie case of
unlawful intentional discrimination and the respondent meets its burden
of clearly and specifically articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
explanation for the conduct at issue through the introduction of admissible evidence, unlawful intentional discrimination shall be established
where the complaining party persuades a trier of fact, by a preponder-
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Hicks to establish the permissive pretext-only approach,"
some courts require the plaintiff to meet a more demanding
standard similar to pretext-plus. 1 Others expressly interpret
ance of the evidence, that--(1) a discriminatory rearon more likely motivated the respondent; or (2) the respondent's proffered explanation is
unworthy of credence.
139 CONG. REc. S. 16,948-50 (daily ed. Nov. 22, 1993). This bill was rebrred to
the Labor and Human Resources Committee on November 22, 1993. 1 CONG. IDEX § 14,246 (1993). Major Owens, Chairman of the Education and Labor Select
Education and Civil Rights Subcommittee, introduced a companion bill in the
House of Representatives. Congress Moves to Overturn Hicks Ruling, DAILY LAB.
REP. (BNA) 235 (Dec. 9, 1993); see generally Susan J. Schleck, Vitle VI-Burden
of Proof-Employee Has Ultimate Burden of Proof in a Tide VfI Case to Show Discriminatory Intent Even if Employer's Reasons for Dismissal Are Pretextual-St.
Mar-s Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993), 25 SETON HALL L. REV.
696, 718 (1994) (discussing the proposed legislation). Although the Clinton Administration and the EEOC support the position that these bills take, the Republican
victories in the 1994 Congressional elections make passage of this or aimila legislation improbable.
" E.g., Washington v. Garrett, 10 F.3d 1421 (9th Cir. 1994) (reversing partial
summary judgment for defendant on the ground that the factfinder could infer
discrimination from inconsistency in defendant's articulated reasons for plaintiffs
termination); Durham v. Xerox Corp., 18 F.3d 836, 838 (10th Cir. 1994) (affirming
summary judgment for defendant on the ground that plaintiff presented no evidence of pretext); Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1125 (7th
Cir. 1994) (affirming summary judgment for defendant on ground that the employer presented legally insufficient evidence to permit the factfinder to infer pretext);
De]arco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166, 170 (2d Cir. 1993) (reversing rmmary judgment for defendant because district court erroneously exempted religious
institution from ADEA); Mitchell v. Data General Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 1317 (4th
Cir. 1993) (affirming summary judgment for defendant becauze plaintiff failed to
create genuine factual dispute over defendant's articulated reasons); see Saulpaugh
v. Monroe Community Hosp., 4 F.3d 134, 142 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating in dictum
that "a fact finder's disbelief of a defendant's proffered rationale may allow it to
infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination in some case"); Southwest
Merchandising Corp. v. NLRB, 53 F.3d 1334, 1339 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding, in a
labor case, that Hicks adopted the permissive pretext-plus standard). But sce United States v. Crosby, 59 F.3d 1133 (11th Cir. 1995) (focusing, at stage three, exclusively on discriminatory intent rather than disproof of pretext).
1 E.g., Huston v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 63 F.3d 771 (8th Cir. 1995) (affirming summary judgment for employer despite statistical and documentary evidence of age discrimination); Udo v. Tomes, 54 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 1995) (affirming summary judgment for the employer because the employee's showing of pretext
failed to raise an issue of discriminatory intent); Anderson v. Baxter Hoaltheare
Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1125 (7th Cir. 1994) (rejecting testimonial evidence of supervisor and co-worker that employee performed satisfactorily as insufficient to controvert employer's explanation that it fired employee for incompetence); Manzer v.
Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1084 (6th Cir. 1994) (requiring
plaintiff to produce "overwhelming" evidence of discriminatory intent); LeBlanc v.
Great Amer. Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 845-49 (1st Cir. 1993) (rejecting statistical and
other evidence of pretext as insufficient); EEOC v. IMPC, Inc., 834 F. Supp. 200,
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Hicks to adopt the pretext-plus rule. 2 One court has evaded
the ambiguity in Hicks but has effectively followed the pretextplus approach by granting an employer summary judgment
despite the employee's submission of evidence creating a material issue of fact on the question of pretext."
A. Post-Hicks: Permissive Pretext Only
The Third Circuit is among those which have interpreted
Hicks to approve the permissive pretext-only standard. In
Seman v. Coplay Cement Co.," U.S. Cement discharged
Seman, a sixty-five-year-old. Seman, who asserted an age discrimination claim against his former employer, had no trouble
proving a prima facie case. U.S. Cement argued at stage two of
the McDonnell Douglas process that it had discontinued seeking new business and had discharged Seman as part of a reduction-in-force initiative because he lacked necessary experience." To rebut U.S. Cement's alleged reason for his discharge, Seman offered evidence that, after his termination, the
company assigned young, inexperienced salesmen to seek new
accounts in his territory.'36 He also submitted proof that he
was more qualified than some of the younger salesmen and
that his superiors had never criticized his job performance.'
The district court denied U.S. Cement's motion for judgment as
a matter of law."
Although reversing judgment for Seman on other

206 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (granting the employer summary judgment, despite the
employee's presentation of evidence creating a genuine issue of fact as to pretext
because the record contained no additional evidence of discrimination).
"

E.g., Atkins v. Coltec Indus., Inc., No. 93-1641, slip op. at 6 (4th Cir. Aug.

18, 1994) (per curiarn), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1094 (1995) (holding that "[m]erely

demonstrating that the employer's proffered reasons were pretextual, however, will
not alone establish age discrimination!); Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus., Inc., 5 F.3d
955 (5th Cir. 1993) (requiring the plaintiff to produce evidence beyond pretext to

establish discrimination).
EEOC v. MCI Int, Inc., 829 F. Supp. 1438, 1451 (D.N.J. 1993) (granting
the employer summary judgment, even assuming pretext, because the employer
offered no additional proof of discrimination).
" 26 F.3d 428, 433 (3d Cir. 1994).
Id.

'3'Id.
137 Id.

" Id. at 429; see FED. R. CIW. P. 50(a).
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grounds, 9 the Third Circuit upheld the district court's denial
of U.S. Cement's motion. 4 The circuit court recognized that
Hicks permits a verdict for a plaintiff based on a finding of pretext,' and pointed out that "Seman had established a prima
facie case of age discrimination and had presented substantial
evidence creating a factual dispute concerning U.S. Cement's
facially legitimate business reasons."
The Ninth Circuit has similarly construed Hicks to adopt
the permissive pretext-only rule. In Washington v. Garrett,"
Washington, a black female in the civil service, was an editor
for a Navy newspaper. The only employee fired as the result of
a reduction-in-force program, she raised allegations of racial
discrimination' at the appropriate civil service administrative tribunal ("Board").' 45 In addition to proving a prima fade
case, 46 Washington presented evidence of racial tension on
the job. The Navy responded that Washington's discharge was
"' The court held the jury instructions misleading. The instructions suggested
that the jury could find for the plaintiff solely because defendant did not discharge
workers younger than he. Seman, 26 F.3d at 438.
14

Id.

1

Id.

142

I&

at 433.

1- 10 F.3d 1421 (9th Cir. 1994).

.. Washington also alleged sex discrimination and illegal retaliation. Id. at
1426. The court affirmed dismissal of these claims. Id. at 1438.
'" This administrative tribunal is known as the Merit Systems Protection
Board.
." The court held that, in a reduction-in-foire context, the elements of a prima
facie case are (1) plaintiff belongs to a protected class; (2) she was discharged
from a job for which she was qualified; and (3) others not in her protected class
were treated more favorably. Compare Mitchell v. Data General Corp, 12 F.3d
1310, 1315 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding that the elements of a prima facie reductionin-force case are: (1) the employee was in the protected class; (2) he was selected
for discharge from a larger group of candidates; (3) he was performing equivalent
to the lowest performers in the retained group; and (4) the retained group contained some workers not in the protected class performing below his level) with
LeBlanc v. Great Amer. Ins Co., 6 F.3d 836, 842 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that the
elements of a prima fasie reduction-in.force case are: (1) the employee was in the
protected class; (2) he was qualified; (3) he was discharged; and (4) he was replaced with someone of roughly the same qualifications, or the employer did not
treat age neutrally, or employees not in the protected class wers retained in the
same position. One writer has suggested that a prima facie reduction-in.force case
should be composed of five elements: "(1) Did a RIF (reduction-in-force) really
occur? (2) Was the plaintiffs job really eliminated? (3) Was the selection process
fair in determining that the plaintiff should be RIFd? (4) Was there a legitimate
reason why the plaintiff wasn't transferred to another position? and (5) What were
the events that surrounded the RIFT Platt, supra note 9, at 209.
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motivated by economic constraints and a realignment of office
structure.'47 After the Board and district court had rejected
the racial discrimination claim, the Ninth Circuit reversed,
finding the Navy's two articulated reasons for its conduct inconsistent."' The court concluded that the factfinder might
infer pretext from the inconsistency.'49
Washington highlights subtle features of the Hicks holding. It shows that proof of pretext may be found in defendant's
case. The defendant may interpose several justifications for its
conduct, each of which taken alone is creditable. Yet the jury
might reasonably find defendant's articulated reasons unbelievable because they contradict one another, even where the
plaintiff presents no evidence of pretext, direct or circumstantial. It is also possible that, based on plaintiff's prima facie
case, the jury might reasonably reject a reason which the defendant offers to justify its conduct. For example, where the
plaintiff was the target of a reduction-in-force plan, one element of a prima facie case is that others not in the protected
class were treated more favorably.5 0 As in Washington, a
plaintiff might make such a showing with proof that the employer eliminated her job alone. This evidence, which satisfies
an element of the prima facie case, may suffice simultaneously
to prove pretext.

Garrett, 10 F.3d at 1425.
at 1434.
14 Id.
Judge Thompson dissented, arguing that the court failed to review the
determination of the Merit Systems Protection Board under the deferential substantial evidence test. Accordingly, he would have affirmed the Board's determination in all respects. Id. at 1438.
'o E.g., Thornbrough v. Columbus and Greenville R.R., 760 F.2d 683, 689 (6th
Cir. 1985); Duffy v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 738 F.2d 1393, 1395 (8d Cir.
1984). Other circuits use somewhat dissimilar elements in an age discrimination
case. See Nitschke v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 68 F.3d 249, 251 (8th Cir. 1995)
(requiring the plaintiff to show that age was a factor which motivated the termination, an element which obfuscates the distinction between stages one and three);
LeBlanc v. Great American Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 842 (1st Cir. 1993) (requiring the
plaintiff show that "the employer did not treat age neutrally or that younger persons were retained in the same position" (quoting Hebert v. Mohawk Rubber Co.,
872 F.2d 1104, 1111 (let Cir. 1989))); Mitchell v. Data General Corp., 12 F.2d
1310, 1315 (4th Cir. 1993) (requiring the plaintiff to show that "he was performing
at a level substantially equivalent to the lowest level of those of the retained
group").
147

145 Id.
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B. Post-Hicks: The MasqueradingStandard
In Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chemical Co., * the
Sixth Circuit ostensibly construed Hicks to support the permissive pretext-only position. In effect, however, the court came
close to following the pretext-plus position, erecting evidentiary
barriers blocking the plaintiffs case. 2 Despite substantial
evidence of pretext, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district
court's grant of a directed verdict for Diamond Shamrock.'
Diamond Shamrock fired Manzer, a fifty-five-yearold employee, and replaced him with someone who was thirtythree. Manzer responded by filing an age discrimination suit.
After Manzer had proven a prima facie case,' Diamond
Shamrock articulated two legitimate reasons for discharging
him: he was "obnoxious and unreliable."' Noting that the
Hicks decision rejected both the pretext-plus and pretext-only
positions, the circuit court properly held that at stage three of
McDonnell Douglas the jury is permitted, but not compelled, to
find for the plaintiff who proves pretext.'
The court
stressed, however, that the plaintiff will reach the jury only if
he produces evidence sufficient to discredit the defendant's alleged legitimate reasons. ' 7 To require less would contradict
McDonnell Douglas and Burdine by shifting the burden of
persuasion to the defendant."
The court discerned three ways in which a plaintiff might
satisfy this burden of proof. First, he may show that the alleged legitimate reasons have no factual basis."' Second, he
may show that the employer did not discharge employees not
in the protected class though those employees engaged in con-

-' 29 F.3d 1078, 1084 (6th Cir. 1994).
u2 Id. at 1083.
Id. at 1085.

I& at 1082. The court stated that the fourth element of the McDonnell
Douglas prima facie case requires that someone not in the protected dam rplace
the plainti% unlike McDonnell Douglas itself which merely required that the defendant seek to fill the position. Id. at 108L
e Manzer, 29 F.3d at 1083.
6

28

Id. at 1083.
I&

9 Id. at 1084.
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duct similar to that for which the plaintiff was allegedly
fired. 60 Third, he may show "that the sheer weight of circumstantial evidence of discrimination makes it 'more likely than
not' that the employer's explanation is a pretext, or coverup."16' Observing that Manzer had relied on the third type of

rebuttal, the court held that, for Manzer to get his case to a
jury, the strength of his circumstantial evidence of age discrimination must overwhelm, "or at least permit a reasonable juror
to conclude that it overwhelms, Diamond Shamrocks nondiscriminatory reasons. n162
Manzer attempted to prove pretext by showing that he
received good performance evaluations and merit increases in
pay even after the incidents of his alleged combativeness and
ineptitude.'63 Despite finding Manzer's proof of pretext irrelevant, the court addressed and dismissed these arguments.
Good evaluations did not constitute ringing affirmations. Merit
pay increases similarly meant nothing because such raises
were given almost universally, though the court did not discuss
the prevalence of merit raises among those deserving discharge.' The circuit court thus ruled that Manzer had
failed, as a matter of law, to show pretext.' Accordingly, it
affirmed the district court's directed verdict for Diamond
Shamrock. 66
Before Hicks, the Sixth Circuit had followed the pretextplus rule.67 Despite its recognition that Hicks rejected this
approach, the Sixth Circuit circumvented the Hicks holding,

160 Id.

"' Manzer, 29 F.3d at 1084.
162 Id.
16

Id.

at 1085.

"6 Id. Lapsing into irrationality, the court characterized these arguments as
irrelevant, because "Ithe issue is not whether Manzer was truly 'obnoxious'
enough, or 'unreliable' enough, to justify firing him." Id. at 1084. Rather, the court
believed those facts relevant to "qualification," one of the elements of a prima facie
case, and not pretext. Id.
Id.

16

Manzer, 29 F.3d at 1084. The court also rejected Manzer's arguments that

the district court erred in admitting evidence of Manzer's inaccurate work and
"bad attitude." Id.
.6.Gagne v. Northwestern Nat. Ins. Co., 881 F.2d 309 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding

that "[t]o meet her rebuttal standard, [plaintiff] was required to produce direct,
indirect or circumstantial evidence that her age was a factor in the decision to
terminate her and that 'but for' this factor she would not have been fired").
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and continued to follow the pretext-plus position by heighten-

ing the threshold for proving pretext. In the Sixth Circuit, circumstantial proof of pretext must "overwhelm" the alleged
legitimate reasons, or at least reasonably permit the jury to
make such a finding. The preponderance of evidence standard,
held applicable by the Supreme Court,"s is, in the opinion of
the Sixth Circuit, too light a burden. Although proof of favorable evaluations and merit raises may indirectly prove pretext,
the court inexplicably found this evidence, not only so unpersuasive to fail as a matter of law, but also irrelevant."2
The Seventh Circuit reached a similar decision in Anderson v.
Baxter Healthcare Corp. There, Anderson, fired allegedly
for inadequate performance, submitted an affidavit of his former supervisor attesting that Anderson was not responsible for
the mishaps allegedly leading to his termination. In addition,
Anderson submitted an affidavit of a coworker asserting that
Anderson was not fired because of his performance. While
recognizing the ambiguity in Hicks,'" the Anderson court
read that decision to adopt the permissive pretext-only
rule.' Yet the court affirmed summary judgment for Baxter,
finding Anderson's submissions legally insufficient to raise a
triable issue of fact as to whether Baxter had fired him for
good cause.' 3 The pretext-plus standard, masquerading as
the permissive pretext-only rule, crept into the case.
C. Post-Hicks:Pretext Plus
As Justice Souter's dissent in Hicks predicted, some courts,
most notably the Fifth Circuit, have gleaned the pretext-plus
rule from the thicket of ambiguities in Hicks. In Bodenheimer

11 St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 2751-52 (1993) (stating
that "should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff must then have an
opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not the true reasons, but were a pretext for
discrimination') (citing Texas Dept. of Comm. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,
253 (1981)).
109 Manzer, 29 F.3d at 1084-85.
70 13 F.3d 1120 (7th Cir. 1994).
17 Id. at 1123.
172 I& at 1123-24.
7 Id. at 1125.
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v. PPG Industries, Inc.," PPG fired Bodenheimer, a fifty-seven-year-old branch manager, who responded by filing an age
discrimination claim. The Fifth Circuit explained the applicable legal standard as follows:
Prior to the Supreme Court's recent decision in St. Mary's Honor
Ctr. v. Hicks confusion reigned among the circuit courts as to whether the plaintiff could prove employment discrimination simply by
showing that the defendant's reasons were not credible. The Court
in St. Mary's put the issue to bed. To prevail ultimately, the plaintiff
must prove, through a preponderance of the evidence, that the
employer's reasons were not the true reason for the employment
decision and that unlawful discrimination was.""

To prove that PPG's reduction-in-force explanation was a
pretext, Bodenheimer asserted that upon terminating him
PPG's regional manager said, "Cliff, I hope when I get to your
age somebody does the same for me." "6 The court understandably found this and other flimsy evidence insufficient to
prove pretext, let alone discriminatory intent. The demanding
pretext-plus rule required more proof. The court therefore affirmed summary judgment for PPG."
More recently, the Fifth Circuit expanded on its questionable interpretation of Hicks. In Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil
Tools, Rhodes, a fifty-six-year-old, sold a product line for
Guiberson, an oil service company. Troubled with economic
difficulties, Guiberson, as part of a reduction-in-force plan,
terminated Rhodes, allegedly because of his faltering sales.
Rhodes sued for age discrimination. At trial, he showed that
within two months of his discharge, Guiberson replaced him
with a forty-two-year-old. Rhodes also pointed out that his
replacement's monthly salary was $2,000 less than his. A sales
manager at Guiberson testified that Rhodes's supervisor had
commented that two younger salesmen would work for the
salary of one older one. Guiberson argued at trial that it had

116

5 F.3d 955 (5th Cir. 1993).
Id. at 957; see also id. at 959 n.8.

176Id. at 958. Bodenheimer submitted two affidavits of customers stating that
the quality of service deteriorated at Bodenheimer s branch office after his departure, and his own affidavit lauding his abilities as superior to those of his succes-

sor. Id. at 959.
2'7Id. at 959.
118

1995).

39 F.3d 537 (5th Cir. 1994), rehg en banc granted, 49 F.3d 127 (5th Cir.

19951

BURDEN-SHIFTING IM EBMPLOYMENT DISCRLTMIN7ON

735

fired Rhodes because of poor performance. The jury found for
Rhodes and the magistrate denied Guiberson's motion for judgment based on insufficiency of evidence." 9
The Fifth Circuit reversed,18 extracting the pretext-plus
rule from Hicks. The court interpreted Hicks to mean that the
language of Burdine allowing a plaintiff to show discrimination
'indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence' is dictum, which is inconsistent
with other language in Burdine and McDonnell Douglas." "W
Undermining the court's reading of Hicks was the Supreme Court's pronouncement that a finding of pretext permits
the jury to find for the plaintiff,' but the circuit court
similarly discounted this language as dictum.s It noted that
the Supreme Court in Hicks had reversed the Eighth Circuit's
determination that Hicks was entitled to judgment as a matter
of law,18 a holding which repudiated the Eighth Circuit's application of the pretext-only rule. The Fifth Circuit reasoned,
however clumsily, that the Supreme Court's ruling was limited
to the efficacy of "pretext-only." Since Hicks was not a "sufficiency of evidence case,"i" its discussion of the quantum of
evidence sufficient to support a finding of pretext was not part
of the Hicks holding. 86
After indulging in a skewed analysis of other circuit court
cases,' the Rhodes court embarked on another tortuous
path to distance itself from Hicks. It correctly cited Hazen
Paper Co. v. Biggins, an age discrimination case, for the

'7' This was the second appeal in the case. On the first appeal, tho court reversed the magistrate's determination that Rhodes's case was time-baned bemuse
he was late in filang a charge with the EEOC.
Guiberson, 39 F.3d at 539.

I& at 542 (citing Ricks, 113 S. Ct. at 2753).
Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2749.
u3 Guiberson, 39 F.3d at 542.
"uId.
"s I& at 543.
Id. at 542-43.
Id- at 543 (citing Anderson v. Baxter Health Care Corp., 13 F.3d 1120 (7th
Cir. 1994)); Durham v. Xerox Corp., 18 F.3d 836 (10th Cir. 1994); Mitchell v. Data
General Corp., 12 F.3d 1310 (4th Cir. 1993). See iL at 550-52 (Garza, J. disnting) (substantially rebutting the majorit's claimed support in case law and demonstrating that the predominant if not overwhelming view among tho circuits is that
Hicks adopted the permissive approach)).
m 113 S. Ct. 1701 (1993).

BROOKLYNLAWREVIEW

[Vol. 61: 703

principle that firing workers over forty to reduce costs does not
show age discrimination." 9 In short, cost reduction is a legitimate business goal, and firing a disproportionately high number of older employees to achieve that end does not violate the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). Despite
abundant authority applying the McDonnell Douglas scheme to
age discrimination cases, 90 the Fifth Circuit found Hazen Paper, not Hicks, relevant to Guiberson because, unlike Hicks
which involved race discrimination, both Hazen Paper and
Guiberson involved issues of age discrimination. The court
implied that Hazen establishes a higher burden for plaintiffs
than does Hicks, and that this standard doomed Rhodes's
case.191

The Rhodes court was correct in concluding that Hazen
deflates Rhodes's argument that proof that an employer fired
older workers to reduce salary costs implies age discrimination.
Hazen does not, however, diminish the relevance of McDonnell
Douglas to Rhodes's claim; nor does it dispose of Rhodes's evidence of pretext.
The Rhodes court ended by citing the "momentous" conse-

Id. at 1707.
The Fifth Circuit itself has applied the McDonnell Douglas scheme to age
discrimination cases. E.g., Atkins v. Coltec Indus., Inc., No. 93-1641, slip op. (5th
Cir. Aug. 18, 1994) (per curiam), cert. denied 115 S. Ct. 1094 (1995); Bodenheimer
v. PPG Indus., Inc., 5 F.3d 955 (5th Cir. 1993). Other circuits invariably do the
same. E.g., Nitscke v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 68 F.3d 249, 251 (8th Cir. 1995);
Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120 (7th Cir. 1994); Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co., 29 F.3d 1078 (6th Cir. 1994); LeBlanc v. Great
American Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836 (1st Cir. 1993); Seman v. Coplay Cement Co., 26
F.3d 428 (3d Cir. 1994); Mitchell v. Data General Corp., 12 F.3d 1310 (4th Cir.
1993); cf Morris v. Newman, No. 93-35705, 1995 WL 567610 (9th Cir. Sept. 26,
1995) (applying the McDonnell Douglas formulation to a case brought under the
Rehabilitation Act, which prohibits the federal government from discriminating on
the basis of disability).
" Judge Garza showed that, contrary to the majority's view, federal courts
universally apply the McDonnell Douglas framework to ADEA cases. He noted that
Hazen and McDonnell Douglas do not call for a different result in the Guiberson
case because Rhodes did not base his claim on the denial of a benefit that correlates with age. See Guiberson, 39 F.3d at 551 (Garza, J., dissenting). Although
Judge Garza was right that pretext might be found in the Guiberson record based
on Guiberson's shifting alleged reasons for firing Rhodes and on Rhodes's replacement with a younger man, Judge Garza seems to have missed the majority's
point. One of Rhodes's arguments was that he was fired because his salary was
higher than that of a younger worker. Hazen implies that firing older workers to
save salary costs is permissible.
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quences of adopting the permissive pretext-only standard."
First, an employer accused of civil rights violations could not
win summary judgment if the plaintiff; unable to show discriminatory animus, merely proved pretext. 19 3 Hardly "momentous," permitting such cases to go to the jury is the very
purpose of the permissive and pure pretext-only approaches,
both of which were the law in many circuits before Hicks.'
Some might even find this result desirable. Second, the court
complained that, if a jury disbelieves the employer's assigned
legitimate reason, the employee will be entitled to judg' The court's statement is false. Under the permissive
ment."95
rule a jury may find for the plaintiff who proves pretext, but it
is not obliged to do so.
Judge Zagel, in a concurring opinion,IS observed that
employers, when firing workers, often give polite explanations
to "soften the blow."97 The purpose of such courtesies is to
avoid animosity in the workplace when the fired worker stays
on temporarily. Explanations made to discharged employees
may therefore be suspect, and evidence of such "lies" may unfairly sway the jury. On the other hand, the jury is responsible
for evaluating the probity of facts. Their common sense gives
them the same insights into human behavior as does the common sense of judges and commentators.
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Garza read Hicks to hold
that a finding of pretext permits, but does not compel, a verdict for the plaintiff.98 He believed that since Guiberson's records falsely indicated that Rhodes was fired because of a reduction in-force, and since Guiberson offered a different and
inconsistent justification at trial-poor performance-the jury
could infer pretext.' Proof of pretext along with the prima

92 I& at 545.

Id,
,' See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
"3 Guiberson, 39 F.3d at 545.
19, Judge Zagel criticized the jury instructions, which said that the plaintiff
could prevail based on either a finding of pretext or a finding that age discrimination was a determining factor in the discharge. Id. (Zagel, J., concurring). He argued that the court should have instructed the jury that it could find for plaintiff
only if age was a determining factor. I&. at 546 (Zagel, J., concurring).
"I Id. at 545-46 (Zagel, J., concurring).
13 Id- at 548 (Garza, J., dissenting).
"3 Id, at 547-48 (Garza, J., dissenting).
293
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facie case should have permitted the jury to find for
Rhodes."'
Judge Garza disagreed also with the majority's pivotal
assumption that the Supreme Court's adoption of the permissive pretext-only standard was dictum.20 ' Neither hypothetical nor abstract, the high Court's statement set forth the standard applicable for determination of the case on remand.0 2
Judge Garza might also have pointed out that the Supreme
Court devoted the entire Hicks opinion to articulating that
standard. Conflicting language may have cast doubt on whether the Court chose the permissive or pretext-plus rule. Nevertheless, the Hicks Court's intent to clarify the evidentiary standard of Burdine is undeniable and the lower courts should
respect that intent, even if one might technically characterize
the critical language in the opinion as dictum.
D. Post-Hicks: Summary Judgment
Most of the courts that follow the pretext-plus interpretation of Hicks never allow the case to reach the jury,20 3 or if
they do, the judge overturns a plaintiff's verdict.'
Courts following the "masquerading" position are similarly unsympathetic to plaintiffs.2 5
Despite its misinterpretation of Hicks, the Rhodes court
observed correctly that the permissive rule precludes summary

200 Guiberson, 39 F.3d at 547-48.
201 Id. at 550 (Garza, J., dissenting).
22 Id. at 550 (Garza, J., dissenting). The Eighth Circuit, quoting the Supreme
Court's articulation of the permissive standard, remanded the case to the district
court "because neither the parties nor the district court has had a full and fair
opportunity to apply the Supreme Court's newly clarified analytical scheme"). As

Judge Garza noted, it is senseless to characterize as dicta the very pronouncement

used to resolve the case. Id. (Garza, J., dissenting).
'

E.g., Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus., Inc., 5 F.3d 955 (5th Cir. 1993) (affirming

summary judgment for employer).
'4 E.g., Atkins v. Coltec Indus., Inc., No. 93-1641, slip op. (5th Cir. Aug. 18,
1994) (per curiam) (affirming district court's grant of judgment for defendant which
overturned jury verdict for plaintiff), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1094 (1995).
200 E.g., Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,
13 F.3d 1120, 1126 (7th Cir.

1994) (affirming summary judgment for employer); Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock
Chemical Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1080-81 (6th Cir. 1994) (affirming directed verdict for

employer); LeBlanc v. Great American Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 849 (1st Cir. 1993)
(affirming summary judgment for employer).
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judgment 2°6 against a plaintiff who creates a material issue
of fact' as to whether the employer's articulated reason was
pretextual.0 This implication arises from the permissive
standard because the jury is permitted, based on proof of pretext, to find for the plaintiff.2 9 To take such a case from the
jury would eviscerate the permissive rule. In effect, such a
result would amount to the application of the pretext-plus rule
which requires evidence of discriminatory intent beyond pretext (and a prima facie case) to defeat summary judgment."
Other courts, applying the Hicks permissive rule correctly,
deny employers summary judgment when the employee creates
an issue of fact regarding pretext. 2 For example, in Washington v. Garrett,212 the Ninth Circuit understood Hicks to
hold that "the fact finder may infer discrimination from the

iR Civ. P. 56.
Summary judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact." FED. I CiM. P. 56. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 251 (1986) (holding that, to defeat a motion for summary judgment, a party
must submit evidence reasonably supporting a finding in its favor).
28 I& at 545.
2'6 FED.
27

"' See Windle, supra note 96, at 223-24 (arguing persuasively that, because the
factfinder may infer discrimination based on pretext alone, a material issue of fact
on the issue of pretext shields the plaintiff from summary judgment).
210 A court applying the pretext-plus rule should grant an employer's motion for
summary judgment unless the employee submits evidence of discriminatory intent
independent of proof of pretext. See, eg., Bodenheimer v. PPG Ind., Inc., 5 F.3d
955, 957 (5th Cir. 1993) (applying pretext-plus rule and granting the employer
summary judgment because the employee failed to submit proof of discriminatory
intent); see also Cadle, supra note 64, at 132 (discussing the favorable treatment
courts following the pretext-plus rule give to defendants' motions for summary
judgment).
2u See, e.g., Stoll v. Missouri Osteopathic Foundation, Inc., 68 F.3d 479 (8th
Cir. 1995) (per curism) (holding that the employee must submit evidence of pretext to avoid summary judgment); Perdomo v. Browner, 67 F.3d 140, 145 (7th Cir.
1995) (reversing the district court's order of summary judgment for the employer
because the employee raised a triable issue of fact as to pretext); York v. Brown,
No. 92 C 7035, 1995 WL 520396, at *3 (7th Cir. Aug. 30, 1995) (holding that [tlo
defeat a summary judgment motion, the employee need produce only enough evidence from which a rational factfnder could infer that the company's proffered
reasons were pretextual"); Washington v. Garrett, 10 F.2d 1421, 1434 (9th Cir.
1993) (denying the employer summary judgment because the plaintiff made a
showing of pretext which entitles her to reach the jury); Tomka v. The Seler
Corp., 66 F.3d 1295 (2d Cir. 1995) (denying the employer summary judgment in a
retaliatory discharge case where the employee submitted evidence of discriminatory
intent).
2
10 F.2d 1421 (9th Cir. 1993).
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showing of pretext."2 1 ' Because the employee created an issue
of fact as to whether the employer's reduction-in-force explanation was pretextual, the court denied the employer's motion for
summary judgment.2 1
Still other courts take a different approach. In EEOC v.
MCI International,Inc.,215 for example, the District Court for
the District of New Jersey recognized that evidence of pretext
"will permit" the trier of fact to infer discriminatory intent.2 16
Its reasoning foundered when it granted the defendant summary judgment "even assuming the falsity of defendant's reasons for purposes of summary judgment. " ' The court insisted on additional proof of discriminatory intent.2"' Apparently,
the court believed that only sometimes when a plaintiff submits probative evidence of pretext on a motion for summary
judgment does he create an issue of fact for the jury on the
issue of discriminatory intent. Other times, however, showing
pretext is insufficient to defeat the motion. How a court might
distinguish between the two circumstances is a mystery. Perhaps the court's tortured analysis was a subterfuge (or pretext)
for using the pretext-plus rule.
VI. FAILINGS OF THE THREE APPROACHES TO PRETEXT
Flaws riddle each of the three versions of the third stage
of the McDonnell Douglas scheme. The failure of all three
pretext rules implies more than their individual inadequacy.
The very structure of the McDonnell Douglas framework is
flawed and, rather than searching for new formulations of
stage three, the Court should abandon McDonnell Douglas
itself.

23 Id.
214

Id.

at 1433.

829 F. Supp. 1438 (D.N.J. 1993).
Id. at 1450 (quoting Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2749).
217 Id. at 1451.
(holding an
2. Id.; see also Udo v. Tomes, 54 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir. 1995)
employee's evidence of pretext insufficient to raise triable issue of fact as to
whether the employer acted with discriminatory intent).
216

21
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A. Pretext Only
Burdine explains that the purpose of the burden-shifting
framework is to sharpen the factual issues.219 The plaintiff,
at stage one, eliminates some of the common justifications for
the employer's challenged conduct.' At stage two, the inquiry focuses on the employer's explanations. m' Resolution of the
case then turns, at stage three, on whether the articulated
reasons are pretextual.' Despite the thrust of McDonnell
Douglas and Burdine, which point to the pretext-only rule, the
Hicks Court rejected this standard and adopted the permissive
rule.
The permissive rule is problematic. Yet, Hicks stumbled in
the right direction with its implicit retreat from the pretextonly standard. Rejection of this approach enhanced, however
imperfectly, the process of adjudicating discrimination cases.
While the pretext-only approach defines the relevant issues, it
arguably confines the range of admissible proof and restricts
the scope of the factfinder's inquiry. By limiting the issues at
stage three to the employer's articulated reasons, the pretextonly rule trades a measure of fairness for a measure of precision. It sacrifices fairness because it denies the defendant the
choice of pursuing any strategy other than to articulate justifications for its conduct.
Sometimes the defendant would, in any event, proceed in
this way. But the defendant might prefer tactically to forego
articulating its reasons. The employer might assess its reasons,
though true, as unpersuasive or likely to antagonize the jury.
It might perceive legitimate reasons as perilously suggestive of
discrimination. For example, personal animosity might register
in the mind of jurors as a code for discriminatory intent. The

"1Burdine, 450 U.S. at 255-56.
21 Id. at 253-54.
2
Id. at 255; see also United States Postal Ser. v. Aihens, 460 U.S. 711, 714
(1983) (citing Burdine for the proposition that, at stage two, the defendant must
set forth the reasons for the challenged employment decision).
Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253 (reairming that, at stage three, the plaintiff must
"have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not his or her true reasons, but were
a pretext for discrimination"); see also McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804.
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defendant should be permitted to exercise the prerogative that
other civil litigants have-to rely on the proof of its choice,
whether circumstantial or otherwise. Similarly, as in all civil
cases, the factfinder should have the freedom to search the
record in deciding the issue. In rejecting the pretext-only rule,
however, Hicks has rendered these concerns academic.'
B. Permissive Pretext Only
The virtue of the permissive pretext-only approach is that
it approximates more closely than the other two alternatives
the practice applicable in any civil trial. Regardless of the
formally articulated reasons, all proof relevant to the issue of
discrimination is admissible and the factfinder may search the
record in resolving the dispute. The permissive approach, however, is less of a sensible compromise than it purports to be. It
transfigures the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting regime
into a charade.' Stages one and two achieve nothing because the factfinder is not limited to considering the employer's
articulated reasons. Thus, at stage three, the factual issues are
as broad as they were at the inception of the case.
The jury must find the court's charge perplexing when the
permissive standard is used. Despite the ostensible narrowing
of issues achieved at stages one and two, the court instructs
the jury that the case begins anew at stage three, informing
the jurors that they are permitted, but not compelled, to infer
discrimination based exclusively on a finding of pretext. The
court offers no guidance as to what factors a jury should weigh
when deciding if pretext alone proves discrimination.' Jurors must puzzle over why the presentation of proof is ordered
according to an elaborate system which is ultimately ignored.
They must doubt whether they understand the instruction. In
evaluating the evidence under the permissive standard, jurors
must wonder how they are to decide the ultimate issue when
the plaintiff has proven a prima facie case and pretext but no
See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
' Justice Souter complained that the majority had reduced the burden-shifting

framework to a "useless ritual" by refusing to limit the issue at stage three to the
reasons that the employer had articulated at stage two. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2761.

"2 See id. at 2755-56 (holding that the factfider may rely on any justification
in the record for the employer's action).
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more.
The permissive pretext-only standard is no standard at all
because it leaves resolution of the ultimate issue to the juror's
predilections rather than to their evaluation of the evidence.
The rule invites arbitrariness, if not bias. Establishing guidelines will not improve the permissive rule because as soon as
the jury considers factors beyond pretext, it is applying a standard which bears a suspicious resemblance to pretext-plus.
In straddling the gulf between pretext-only and pretext-plus,
the permissive standard offers an unreasoned compromise.
C. Pretext Plus
After Hicks, the pretext-plus rule avoided extinction, clinging to ambiguous language in the opinion.' This rule is the
most unsatisfactory of the three because it offends good sense.
Discrimination is strongly implied when an employer's socalled legitimate reason is exposed as a pretext. An employer
will typically articulate a legitimate reason if it has one. Sometimes, admittedly, the conclusion of discrimination will not
follow from an employer's articulation of false reasons,'2 but
to preclude the jury from inferring discrimination based on a
finding of pretext, as the pretext-plus rule directs, defies common experience.
By requiring proof of discrimination in addition to pretext,
the pretext-plus rule undercuts the purposes of stages one and
2' The Hicks Court asserted that the jury's finding of 'mendacity" by the employer in articulating a "legitimate" reason may create a basis for finding discriminatory intent. Id. at 2749. This standard is inadequate. Employers may lie to
conceal objectionable but nondiscriminatory motives. As the majority itself remarked, civil rights law condemns discrimination, not lying. Id. at 2754. It is also
true that if the jury disbelieves the "legitimate" reason, it is more likely than not
that the employer discriminated, even if the jury does not find employer dishonesty.
I Though the Court apparently adopted the permissive standard, id. at 2749,
it muddied the holding by saying that "[ilt is not enough, in other words, to disbelieve the employer, the factflnder must believe the plaintiffs explanation of intentional discrimination." Id. at 2754. Seizing on this language, the dissent chided the
majority for writing a self-contradictory opinion. Id. at 2762 (Souter, J. dissenting).
The dissent's concern proved justified, for some lower courts have interpreted
Hicks to establish the pretext-plus rule. Eg., Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tool, 39
F.3d 537, 542 (5th Cir. 1994) (discounting as dicta the permissive pretext-only
language in Hicks).
2
See Ricks, 113 S. Ct. at 2756.

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61: 703

two. Any effort at narrowing the issues at those stages is in
vain. The permissive standard has the same problem, but
pretext-plus magnifies this fault by precluding the inference of
discriminatory intent based on a showing of pretext alone.
D. No More Alternatives
The three rules are undesirable because all are wedded to
a burden-shifting approach which hamstrings the parties' evidentiary presentations and confuses the jury.' The Supreme
Court, in Hicks, may have recognized these inadequacies when
it shrank, however subtly, from the failed McDonnell Douglas
system.' 0 But the Court should go further. It should acknowledge the inadequacies of McDonnell Douglas by repudiating the faulty burden-shifting model.

VII. ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS wiTH THE MCDONNELL DOUGLAS
SCHEME
In addition to the inadequacy of all three pretext-rule
formulations, a problem which in itself calls the McDonnell
Douglas approach into question, each stage of the McDonnell
Douglas approach may obstruct the factfinder from fairly resolving the ultimate issue. By erecting artificial evidentiary
barriers, each stage restricts the parties from presenting their
cases as they see fit. Although the pre-Hicks framework may
sometimes have facilitated the inquiry by requiring an inference of discrimination based on a finding of pretext, Hicks
erases any such benefits, making such a finding permissive.
The Civil Rights Act of 1991, which amended Title VII, permits
the same inference without the rigidity of McDonnell Douglas.
Perhaps most significantly, the requirements of a prima facie
case, under many circumstances, violate the 1991 amendment
to Title VII. "3

' See supra notes 219-228 and accompanying text.

- O Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993).
23

See infra notes 232-93 and accompanying text.
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A. Conflict with Title VII
The burden-shifting approach, in theory if not in practice,
is frequently inconsistent with the Civil Rights Act of 1991.'
To understand the inconsistency, one must first examine the
origin of the 1991 Act.
Congress passed the 1991 Act to overrule several Supreme
Court decisions.' One such decision, Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins,' provided the analysis for mixed-motives cases.
Although overruled, Price Waterhouse has left a legacy of misunderstanding because courts and commentators have misinterpreted it (and the motivating factor test of the 1991 Act
which supplanted it) to apply only to direct evidence cases,
while interpreting the McDonnell Douglas scheme to apply
only to circumstantial cases.
1. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: The Mixed-Motives
Analysis
Price Waterhouse, a prominent accounting firm, passed
over Hopkins, a woman, for partnership. The firm argued that
Hopkins' abrasiveness justified the decision. Hopkins alleged
that the firm rejected her because of her sex. To support her
claim, she offered evidence that several partners of Price Waterhouse had made stereotypical sexual comments about her
and that these comments influenced the firm's disposition of
her partnership application.
The Court held that where an adverse employment action
results from two causes, one legitimate and the other discrimi-

42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (1994).
s See, e.g., Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 US. 642 (1989) (fixing the
burden on the plaintiff in a disparate impact case to prove that the employer's job
screening methods measured attributes unrelated to job performance or business
necessity).
=' 490 U.S. 228 (1989).

='Partners described her as "macho" and criticized her for using profanity "because ii's a lady using foul language." The Court found most significant the advice
she received from a partner, who, explaining why the firm had delayed her application for partnership, suggested that she 'walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewely." Id. at 228.
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natory, the employer has not violated Title VII if the action
would have occurred based on the legitimate reason alone."8
The plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving that discrimination motivated the action.2 7 The burden of proof then
shifts to the defendant to show that it would have taken the
same action based on the legitimate reason.'
Decided sixteen years after McDonnell Douglas and eight
years after Burdine, Price Waterhouse addressed the situation
where mixed motives influence the employment action. 9 Attempting to harmonize Price Waterhouse with Burdine, the
Court explained that "[w]here a decision was the product of a
mixture of legitimate and illegitimate motives.., it simply
makes no sense to ask whether the legitimate reason was 'the
true reason' for the decision-which is the question asked by
Burdine."20 The Court acknowledged that "Burdine's evidentiary scheme will not help us decide a case admittedly involving both kinds of considerations,"241 but believed Burdine useful for determining pretext cases. 42
McDonnell Douglas and Burdine, on the one hand, and
Price Waterhouse, on the other, address different factual settings. McDonnell Douglas and Burdine apply when the issue is
whether the employer's articulated legitimate reason is a pretext. Price Waterhouse applied (before overruled by the 1991
Act) when the legitimate reason was demonstrably not
236Id. at 242.

Id. at 241-42.
Id. at 242.
"' The Price Waterhouse Court borrowed the mixed-motives rationale from Mt.
Healthy Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). In Mt. Healthy, the
school board discharged a public school teacher for two reasons: he made an obscene gesture to students, and he disclosed the school's proposed, confidential faculty dress code to a disc jockey who revealed the code on the air. The board's
dismissal of the teacher based on his obscene conduct was legitimate. The discharge based on his comments about the dress code violated his First Amendment
freedom of speech. Id. at 287. The Court held that, once the teacher proved that
the First Amendment violation was a factor which motivated the discharge, the
burden of persuasion shifted to the board to show that "it would have reached the
same decision . . . even in the absence of the protected conduct." Id.
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 247 (citations omitted).
27
23

2Id.

Id. Concurring in the judgment, Justice White noted: "The court has made
clear that 'mixed-motives' cases, such as the present one, are different from pretext cases such as McDonnell Douglas and Burdine." Id. at 260 (White, J., concurring).
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pretextual, but rather, where the issue was whether the legitimate reason alone would have led to the adverse employment
action.
Nothing in any of these decisions suggests that the application of the different approaches depends on different qualities of proof. Yet this misapprehension of the opinions has
stamped itself indelibly on them.2 5 The confusion may have
arisen with Justice O'Connor's remark that "McDonnellDouglas itself dealt with a situation where the plaintiff presented
no direct evidence" of discrimination.2" She believed
McDonnell Douglas applicable where the plaintiff relies on
circumstantial or indirect evidence of discrimination." By
contrast, Justice O'Connor felt that in mixed-motives cases,
such as Price Waterhouse, "[the] plaintiff must show by direct
evidence that an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor
in the decision."4 Justice O'Connor's position, though mistaken, predominates among courts, 7 and most cominmenta-

I See infra notes 244-48 and accompanying text.
2,'
Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 270 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
'"Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor's view has gained acceptance
among commentators. See Mack A. Player, Applicants, Applicants in the Hall,
Who's the Fairest of Them All? Comparing Qualifications under Employment Discrimination Law, 46 OHio ST. L. 277, 284 (stating that McDonnell Douglas pro.
vides a method for proving discrimination claims by "indirect, objective,
nonstatistical elements"); Odell, supra note 8, at 1251 (remarking that the Supreme Court designed McDonnell Douglas to aid cvil rights plaintiffs lacking direct evidence of discriminatory intent); O'eary, supra note 9, at 824-25 (asserting
that McDonnell Douglas applies to "circumstantial" caes); Windfle, supra note 96,
at 213 (commenting that the McDonnell Douglas framework applies to ca=s3 involving "indirect" evidence).
' Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 276 (O'Connor, J., concurring.) Justice Kennedy, in a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia
joined, argued correctly that the Burdine framework was intended to apply in all
disparate-treatment cases, regardless of whether the evidence is direct or circumstantial. Id. at 289 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Nevertheless, he echoed Justice
O'Connor's error of applying the Price Waterhouce mixed-motives analysis to cases
based on direct evidence. Id. at 280 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). He faulted the majority for violating the mandate of Burdine by shifting the burden of persuasion to
the defendant in mixed motives cases. IL
'7" See, e.g., Caban-Wheeler v. Elsea, 904 F.2d 1549, 1554 (11th Cir. 1990)
(quoting Justice O'Connor and agreeing with her that Price Waterhouse rather
than McDonnell Douglas applies when the plaintiff preents direct evidence of
discrimination); EEOC v. MCI, Intl, Inc., 829 F. Supp. 1438, 1446 (D.N.J. 1993)
(stating that "Mf the plaintiff is able to point to direct evidence of discrimination,
the burden shifting analysis first enunciated by the Supreme Court in McDonnell
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tors now unquestioningly accept this viewpoint."48
Rather than establishing a framework for deciding cases
based on direct as opposed to circumstantial evidence, Price
Waterhouse established an exception to the rule, articulated in
Burdine, that the burden of persuasion is always on the plaintiff.2 9 This exception provides that once the plaintiff has
proven a discriminatory motive for the defendant's action, the
burden of persuasion shifts to the defendant to prove that it
would have reached the same decision based on a legitimate
reason." The Court, however, did not distinguish Price Waterhouse from McDonnell Douglas based on whether the plain-

tiff relies on direct or circumstantial evidence.
The very language of Burdine refutes Justice O'Connor's
Douglas is inapplicable") (citation omitted). Of course, the McDonnell Douglas
framework applies to circumstantial as well as direct evidence cases. As the dissent in Hicks commented, "we devised a framework [in McDonnell Douglas and
Burdine] that would allow both plaintiffs and the courts to deal effectively with
employment discrimination revealed only through circumstantial evidence." Hicks,
113 S. Ct. at 2757 (Souter, J., dissenting). This statement, however, does not purport to restrict the application of McDonnell Douglas to circumstantial cases; it
merely instructs that McDonnell Douglas is suited for such cases. Indeed, the
Hicks majority reaffirmed that the plaintiff may prove discriminatory intent "directly" under the McDonnell Douglas approach. Id. at 2752.
' See Cadle, supra note 64, at 122 (stating that the McDonnell Douglas framework applies in circumstantial cases); Essary, supra note 3, at 426 (commenting
that the courts apply the McDonnell Douglas model to circumstantial cases whereas the motivating factor test of the 1991 Act applies to direct evidence cases and
advising plaintiffs to search for direct evidence so as to avail themselves of the
more favorable motivating-factor test); Eileen Kaufman, Employment Discrimination: Recent Developments in the Supreme Court, 10 TOURO L. REV. 525, 627-28
(1994) (reporting that McDonnell Douglas applies in circumstantial but not direct
evidence cases).
I Holding that Price Waterhouse applies to any mixed-motives case, regardless
of whether the plaintiff relies on direct or circumstantial evidence, the Court asserted that "[i]f the plaintiff fails to satisfy the factfinder that it is more likely
than not that a forbidden characteristic played a part in the employment decision,
then she may prevail only if she proves, following Burdine, that the employer's
stated reason for its decision is pretextual." Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 247
n.12. This language does not exclude circumstantial evidence.
"o Determination of the ultimate issue of discrimination under both McDonnell
Douglas and Price Waterhouse turns on the existence of a legitimate reason for the
employer's conduct. The essential difference between the two cases is who bears
the burden of proof. McDonnell Douglas places the burden on the plaintiff to disprove the articulated legitimate reason by a preponderance of the evidence. Price
Waterhouse places the burden on the defendant to prove the legitimate reason by
a preponderance of the evidence. Since in both cases the factfinder is apt to find
in favor of the party presenting the stronger case, the difference between the two
cases may be minimal if not illusory.
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analysis. In Burdine, a unanimous Supreme Court held that a
plaintiff in a discrimination case may succeed "directly by
persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more likely
motivated the employer." In United States Postal Service v.
Aikens,"2 the Court again rejected Justice O'Connor's views
when it held that under McDonnell Douglas a plaintiff "may
prove his case by direct or circumstantial evidence.'
The
McDonnell Douglas approach, as clarified by Burdine and
Aikens, is not limited to circumstantial cases.
Conversely, the evidence in Price Waterhouse, rather than
being direct, was arguably if not definitively circumstantial.
Circumstantial evidence requires an inference to reach the
ultimate conclusion.' The statements of sexual stereotyping
in Price Waterhouse do not prove directly that the firm discriminated against Hopkins based on her sex but rather expose an
attitude from which discrimination may be inferred.
The
1991 Act, which rejected the Price Waterhouse mixed-motives
analysis, did not alter the applicability of both direct and circumstantial evidence to mixed-motives cases.'

2s" Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256. The Court went on to remark that the plaintiff
could prevail indirectly, by showing that the employer's explanation is unworthy of
belief; that is, by proving pretext. Id.
2 460 U.S. 711 (1983).
"' Id
at 714 n.3. See Whitis, supra note 16, at 293 (obrorving that McDonnell
Douglas accommodates the use of direct and circumstantial evidence to prove discrimination).
2, Circumstantial evidence is "[t]estimony not based on actual personal knowledge or observation of the facts in controversy but of other facs from which de.ductions are drawn, showing indirectly the facts sught to be proved." BIACWS
LAW DIcTIONARY 243 (6th ed 1990); see also 1 MCCORIUCK ON EVMENCE § 185,
at 777 (4th ed. 1992) ("Direct evidence is evidence which, if believed, recelves a
matter in issue. Circumstantial evidence may also be testimonial, but even if the
cirmumstances depicted are accepted as true, additional reasoning is required to
reach the proposition to which it is directed.).
' One commentator has argued that "the evidence pre3ented in Price Waterhouse was not direct evidence in the hornbook definition cence. Direct ovidonce is
evidence which, if believed, resolves a matter in issue." The evidence in Price
Waterhouse "requires additional reasoning to reach the proposition to which it is
directed." Essary, supra note 3, at 428.
" See infra note 260 and accompanying text.
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2. The Civil Rights Act of 1991: The Motivating-Factor
Test
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 overruled the mixed-motives
analysis of Price Waterhouse by requiring a plaintiff to prove
merely that discrimination was a factor which motivated the
adverse employment decision.' The 1991 Act provides that
"an unlawful employment practice is established when the
complaining party demonstrates that race, color, sex, religion
or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment
practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.' A Title VII plaintiff therefore has a valid claim when
mixed motives, one permissible and the other forbidden, contributed to the adverse employment decision. Regardless of its
impact on the challenged action, a legitimate motive is not a
defense but is relevant only to determining the remedy. 9
Nothing in the statute or its legislative history260 sug42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(m) (Supp. 1992).
" Id. The amendment to Title VII changed the law applicable to mixed-motives
cases by overruling Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989), insofar as
Price Waterhouse held that an employer who illegally discriminates is exonerated
from liability if a concurrent permissible reason would have caused the employment action absent the discrimination.
27

=" Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) of the 1991 Act says:
On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under § 2000e-2(m)
of this title and a respondent demonstrates that the respondent would
have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor, the court(i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as provided
in clause (ii)), and attorney's fees and costs demonstrated to be directly
attributable only to the pursuit of a claim under
§ 2000e-2(m) of this title; and
(ii) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment, described in subpara-

graph (A).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (Supp. I1 1991).
"' The House Report on the proposed legislation destined to become the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 states:
To establish liability under proposed Subsection 703(1), the complaining
party must demonstrate that discrimination actually contributed or was
otherwise a factor in an employment decision or action. Thus, in providing liability for discrimination that is a "contributingfactor," the Committee intends to restore the rule applied in many federal circuits prior to
the Price Waterhouse decision that an employer may be held liable for
any discrimination that is actually shown to play a role in a contested
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gests that a plaintiff cannot rely on circumstantial evidence to
show that discrimination motivated the employer. A plaintiff
may offer all proof of discriminatory intent, whether direct or
circumstantial, under the motivating factor test of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991. A plaintiff presenting a case under the
McDonnell Douglas approach may and should offer the same
proof of discriminatory intent, for Hicks holds that proving
pretext without evidence of discriminatory animus does not
assure victory."'
3. McDonnell Douglas: Heightening Plaintiffs' Burden
McDonnell Douglas requires plaintiff to prove a prima
facie case. The 1991 Act contains no such requirement. Where
a plaintiff fails to prove a prima facie case, McDonnell Douglas
requires dismissal of the claim irrespective of proof that discrimination motivated the employer.2" In such cases,
McDonnell Douglas clashes with the 1991 Act.
Some illustrations highlight the potential disparity between the McDonnell Douglas scheme and the motivatingfactor test of the 1991 Act. A plaintifi, unqualified for a job, is
entitled, under the 1991 Act, to relief if he proves that discrimination motivated the employer's decision to reject, demote or
fire him. Similarly, once a rejected job applicant proves a discriminatory motive, the 1991 Act affords him relief even if the
employer stopped soliciting applicants. 2 s The same result obtains where a worker who is a casualty of a reduction-in-force
plan proves discriminatory motive. He does not forfeit his right
to relief simply because he cannot prove that he performed on
the job as ably as some of the retained workers. In all such
cases, courts, dutifully applying the McDonnell Douglas prima

employment decision.
1991 CoNG. AND ADMIN. NEWS, House Report No. 102-400, at 686 (LMy 17,
1991).
28 Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2754.
McDonneU Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Hicks, 113 S. Ct at 2746-47; Mitchell
v. Data General Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 1318 (4th Cir. 1993) (affining summary
judgment for the employer because plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie cane);
EEOC v. IPMIC, Inc., 834 F. Supp. 200, 206-07 (E.D. Mich. 1993) (granting summary judgment to the employer because the plaintiff failed to establish a prima
facie case).
2'
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (Supp. MI1992).
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facie case, must deny relief to injured plaintiffs.2"' By denying recovery to plaintiffs who can prove that discrimination
was a motivating factor, McDonnell Douglas violates the very
statute it avowedly promotes.
4. McDonnell Douglas: A Superfluous Approach
One might argue that where the plaintiff disproves the
defendant's 'legitimate" reason but has no proof of discriminatory intent, McDonnell Douglas enhances rather than diminishes a plaintiff's prospects for a favorable outcome because it
permits the jury to find for the plaintiff despite his failure to
meet the motivating-factor test of the 1991 Act. It is also arguable that McDonnell Douglas helps the plaintiff whose evidence of discrimination is sufficient to prevail only when considered in conjunction with his proof of pretext. In other words,
plaintiffs whose proof of pretext boosts otherwise deficient
evidence of discrimination over the requisite evidentiary
threshold benefit from the McDonnell Douglas scheme. However, such cases are probably the exception rather than the rule.
The readiness of many courts to grant judgment as a matter of
law to a defendant when a plaintiffs case is questionable decreases the likelihood that McDonnell Douglas will serve plaintiffs with marginal cases.26
More fundamentally, it is questionable that the McDonnell
Douglas scheme, as modified by the Hicks permissive rule,
ever enhances a plaintiffs case. McDonnell Douglas is not
necessary to bring the issue of pretext before the finder of fact.
Discrediting defendant's articulated legitimate reason is indirect proof that discriminatory intent motivated the defendant.
Proof of pretext is, therefore, relevant to and may satisfy the
"motivating factor" test of the 1991 Act.
Rather than applying the McDonnell Douglas framework,

' E.g., Henson v. Liggett Group, Inc., 63 F.3d 270 (8th Cir. 1995); Mitchell v.
Data General Corp., 12 F.3d 1310 (4th Cir. 1993); EEOC v. IPMC, Inc., 834 F.
Supp. 200 (E.D. Mich. 1993); EEOC v. MCI Int'l, Inc., 829 F. Supp. 1438 (D.N.J.
1993). For a discussion of these cases see infra notes 273-92 and accompanying
text.
" E.g., Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1126 (7th Cir.
1994); Durham v. Xerox Corp., 18 F.3d 836, 840-41 (10th Cir. 1994); LeBlanc v.
Great American Ins. Co., 6 F.3d 836, 849 (1st Cir. 1993).
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all disparate-treatment discrimination cases should follow the
traditional practices of civil litigation, as do cases adjudicated
under the motivating-factor test of the 1991 Act. Such practices allow for adducing proof of pretext. Plaintiffs attorney, on
cross-examination, might ask the defendant or its responsible
agent why he made the contested employment decision. If the
party who made the employment decision does not otherwise
testify, the plaintiff could call him as a hostile witness. Having
elicited the alleged reason for the challenged action, the plaintiff would offer rebuttal evidence. Thus, without the formalism
of the McDonnell Douglas scheme the plaintiff could present to
the finder of fact evidence of pretext. To decide the ultimate
issue of discriminatory intent, the jury would weigh this testimony along with all relevant evidence. Proof bearing on the
issue of pretext would be before the factfinder. Pretext, however, would not receive undue emphasis and would not necessarily be the determining factor at trial.
B. Disadvantagesto the Employee
1. Stage One and the Prima Facie Case: The Denial of
Meritorious Claims
The mischief of McDonnell Douglas does not end with a
technical inconsistency with Title VII. Requiring plaintiffs to
prove a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas framework has doomed otherwise valid discrimination claims.
Courts, apparently recognizing the potential injustice caused
by strict application of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie
case, often search for alternative, though questionable, grounds
to support decisions against civil rights plaintiffs.'
The purpose of a prima facie case is to eliminate some of
the most common defenses268 and thereby sharpen the is-

See infra notes 273-92 and accompanying text.
=' Many courts rely, in the alternative, on a purported lack of evidence of
discriminatory intent, despite substantial evidence to the contrary. See, eg.,
Henson v. Liggett Group, Inc., 63 F.3d 270, 277 (8th Cir. 1995); Mitchell v. Data
General Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 1317-18 (4th Cir. 1993); EEOC v. IMPC, Inc., 834 F.
Supp. 200, 203-06 (E.D. Mich. 1993).
" Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253-54.
2S
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sues.269 The first element of a prima facie case, regardless of
the factual context, is that the plaintiff belongs to a protected
class."7 Fundamental to any civil rights claim, this element
is logically necessary to a prima facie case if such a construct
is used. The remaining elements of a prima facie case, however, vary with the factual settinge 1 and even under identical
facts the elements differ from court to court. 2
In a refusal-to-hire case, an element of a prima facie case
is that the plaintiff applied for the job in questionY This
element seems unobjectionable. Yet even this apparently benign requirement may scuttle an arguably meritorious claim.
In E.E.O.C. v. IPMC, Inc., 4 for example, the plaintiff, a sixty-year-old electrician, applied unsuccessfully for one of eight
openings at the defendant's plant. All eight positions went to
younger men. A month later, the defendant advertised another
position for an electrician. Although the defendant's policy was
to keep applications active for two years, the defendant did not
notify the plaintiff of the opening, and the job too went to a
younger man. The plaintiff filed a complaint alleging age discrimination. Because the plaintiff had not applied for the new
opening, the court held that he failed to establish a prima facie
case and granted the defendant summary judgment." If this
case had gone to a jury, the result might have been different.
Another element of a prima facie refusal-to-hire case is
that after the defendant rejects a qualified minority applicant
the defendant continue to seek applicants with plaintiff's qualifications.' 76 In most cases where the employer discriminated,
''

Id. at 255-56.

270 McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
" Id.

at 802 n.13.
See supra note 146 (discussing the elements of a prima facie case in a reduction-in-force case).
' See, e.g., Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 575 (1978); Tye v.
Polaris Joint Voc. Sch. Dist., 811 F.2d 315, 317 (6th Cir. 1987); King v. Palmer,

778 F.2d 878, 880 (D.C.Cir. 1985).
2'7

834 F. Supp. 200 (E.D. Mich. 1993).

Id. at 206-07. Plaintiff alleged also that defendant violated the ADEA by
rejecting him for the initial openings. The defendant argued that plaintiff was not
as qualified as the accepted applicants. Although finding that the plaintiff had
created a triable issue of fact as to whether the defendant's reason was a pretext,
the court granted the defendant summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff
failed to offer additional evidence of discriminatory intent. Id. at 203-06.
"' McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
2
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the job will remain open and the plaintiff will encounter no
difficulty proving this element. But nothing guarantees that
the employer will persist in trying to fill the position. A sophisticated employer, perhaps under advice of counsel, might abolish the position to insulate himself from liability. Presumably
the plaintiffs case is built on circumstantial evidence, because
the courts apply McDonnell Douglas to circumstantial cases.
Such a case might be based on persuasive statistical evidence.
For example, white applicants of the defendant might have
fared better than their black counterparts possessing superior
qualifications. Black workers deserving promotions might have
been overlooked systematically. In addition to this evidence, a
plaintiff will try to prove that his employer's professed reason
for rejecting him is pretextual. The plaintiff might expose the
reason as a lie conjured up on the eve of trial. The record
might not even hint of an alternative legitimate explanation.
Despite a strong circumstantial case and despite meeting the
permissive pretext-only standard, the plaintiff, incapable of
proving this element of a prima facie case, is stymied.
Henson v. Liggett Group, Inc. 7 illustrates the absurdity
of requiring a plaintiff to show that the defendant rejected him
or her for a job that was officially "open," and for which the defendant continued to seek applicants. Henson, a fifty-year-old
Liggett employee, sought to transfer to another position with
the company when her job became slated for elimination. After
the position Henson sought went to a younger applicant, she
sued Liggett for age discrimination. The circuit court expressed
doubt whether Henson could survive summary judgment because Liggett had never formally posted the opening or accepted any applicants (other than Henson and the person hired) for
the jobY8
A prima facie refusal-to-hire case under the McDonnell
Douglas framework also requires that the plaintiff qualified for
the position for which he unsuccessfully applied. 9
63 F.3d 270 (8th Cir. 1995).
11 Id. at 275. The circuit court ultimately affirmed the district courts order of
summary judgment for Liggett on the ground that Henson failed to prczent sufficient evidence of pretext. Id. at 277. Notably, the circuit court found HEnson's
submission of discriminatory statements of Liggett managers insucient to withstand the summary judgment motion because the age-biazed statements were not
directed specifically at her. Id. at 276.
"' McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; zze Malamud, supra note 10, at 22822"
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McDonnell Douglas does not account for the situation where a
defendant summarily rejects an unqualified applicant for an
illegal discriminatory reason. In Mitchell v. Data General
Corp.,280 a case of alleged wrongful discharge based on age
discrimination, the Fourth Circuit affirmed summary judgment
for the employer, in part, because the discharged employee
failed to show that he was performing at a level that met the
employer's legitimate expectations."' The potential injustice
of such an approach is that, in addition to plaintiffs qualifications, discriminatory intent might have motivated the employer, or, more strikingly, the plaintiffs qualifications may have
played only a minor role in influencing an employer's decision
motivated primarily by discrimination. In a mixed-motives
case, the legitimate reason should not shield the employer. 2
In a case of discharge or demotion, rather than rejection,
an element of a prima facie case is that the employer sought a
replacement for the aggrieved employee.' The employer,
however, may have discriminated although it did not seek a replacement. A convincing circumstantial case, lacking proof that
someone filled plaintiffs position, will never reach the jury.'
Where the defendant claims to have fired the plaintiff as
part of a reduction-in-force plan, the elements are not settled.' Some courts require a plaintiff to show that the employer retained some unprotected workers who were performing below the level of the plaintiff.' The plaintiff will, in
many instances, be able to make such a showing. Where the
90 (arguing that courts interpret the prima facie element 'job qualification" inconsistently and that the courts thus do not apply McDonnell Douglas uniformly).
20

12 F.3d 1310 (4th Cir. 1993).

"3 Id. at 1317. The court granted the defendant summary judgment for a second reason: the plaintiff could not prove that he had performed superior to retained, unprotected employees. Id. at 1316-17; see also infra notes 287-89 and
accompanying text. It also ruled that Mitchell did not establish pretext. Id. at
1317-18.
' If discriminatory intent contributed to the defendant's conduct, he is liable.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).
' Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1122 (7th Cir. 1994).
2" See Lopez v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 930 F.2d 157, 161 (2d Cir. 1991) (affirming summary judgment for the employer because the plaintiff failed to prove that
"other sales representatives received training opportunities that [the employee] was
denied," which is an element of a prima facie case when the employee alleges
wrongful discharge).
See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
Mitchell v. Data General Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 1315 (4th Cir. 1993).
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plaintiff fails to meet this burden, the discrimination claim
may indeed be dubious. In such cases the prima facie case
functions appropriately because it screens out weak if not
insupportable claims.
A problem arises, however, when a plaintiff who has suffered discrimination cannot prove his performance superior to
that of unprotected employees who kept their jobs. If the inability to prove this element coincided necessarily with unworthy discrimination claims, there would be no problem. To put
the matter differently, if all victims of discrimination in a reduction-in-force case could fairly be expected to prove that
unprotected employees performing less satisfactorily received
favorable treatment, this element would be a sound component
of a prima facie case. However, some victims may find this
element impossible to prove. In Mitchell v. Data General Corp.
the plaintiff could not, in the court's view, satisfy this element and the result was summary judgment for the employer. ' If a plaintiff fails to satisfy this element, the court
must grant the defendant summary judgment regardless of
inferential proof of discrimination.'
Such a situation is more than a remote possibility. For
example, assume that a work force of one hundred factory
workers is composed of eighty whites and twenty blacks. The
employer, paring his roster to eighty, fires all twenty black
workers. Not a single white worker loses his job. A discharged
black worker may not be able to prove past job performance
superior to many or even any of the white workers. Comparisons may be difficult to draw. Performance of repetitive factory
tasks may be indistinguishable. More ominously, the
employer's records of the plaintiff may indicate, through bias
and even premeditation, an unfounded work history of inferior
performance. Although the disproportionately high number of
black firings raises an overwhelming inference of discrimination, the facts of this example do not support a prima facie

Id. at 1316.
Id, at 1318. The court also measured Mitchel's cane against a prima facie
discharge-for-cause case. One element of this prima facie caze is that the employee
was functioning at a level commensurate with the employers legitimate expectations. The court held that Mitchell did not meet this elemont Id. at 1317. See
supra notes 281-82 and accompanying text.
2" In Mitchel the court found inadequate evidence of pretext Id. at 1317-18.
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case.
A reduction-in-force plaintiff may also be required to prove
that the employer retained a similarly situated employee not
in the protected class. ° In EEOC v. MCI International,
Inc.,' i an age discrimination case, MCI asserted that it fired
the plaintiff because of poor job performance. The plaintiff impeached this allegation by submitting a letter of recommendation in which his supervisor at MCI praised his performance.
He also presented persuasive statistical evidence that MCI had
disproportionately targeted older workers for dismissal. The
court nonetheless dismissed the claim because the plaintiff
could not prove a prima facie case. 2
Proponents of McDonnell Douglas might argue that shortcomings of its prima facie cases do not lead to the conclusion
that the courts should scrap McDonnell Douglas. Recasting the
elements might salvage the approach. So many problems
plague the McDonnell Douglas scheme, however, that there
seems to be little wisdom in retaining it.
2. Stage Three: Proving Pretext
At stage two, the defendant must merely articulate, not
prove, a legitimate reason for the adverse employment action." An employer might brazenly assign a reason for his
conduct which the jury finds incredible. The proffered justification might nevertheless satisfy the employer's burden of production. Although the jury disbelieves the employer, he has
articulated a legitimate reason which stands unless the plaintiff disproves it at stage three. If the plaintiff cannot meet this
burden, the employer wins the case based on the disbelieved
reason. For example, the employer might assert that he and
the employee "just didn't get along." Although this reason
might well be true, it might be a lie transparent to the jury.
The employer has nevertheless met his burden of production.
The employee may have no way of proving that the employer's
-0 EEOC v. MCI Intl, Inc., 829 F. Supp. 1438, 1455 (D.N.J. 1993).
291

2

Id.
Id. The court also dismissed the claim because the plaintiff had failed to

present direct evidence of discriminatory intent. Id.
2
E.g., Armstrong v. Dallas, 997 F.2d 62, 65 (5th Cir. 1993); King v. Palmer,
778 F.2d 878, 881 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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reason is a euphemism for prejudice. Strict application of
McDonnell Douglas does not allow a jury to express its conviction that the employer's professed innocence masks illegal
discrimination.
C. Disadvantages to the Employer: Articulating a Legitimate
Reason at Stage Two
The employer may indeed have not gotten along with the
fired employee. A prudent litigant might refrain from raising
this explanation because a jury might wrongly infer pretext
from it. Strategy might preclude the employer from articulating other legitimate reasons that motivated the challenged
action. The employer might perceive vague but true reasons as
unpersuasive and suggestive of pretext. Embarrassing reasons
might shun revelation. Employers might conceal reasons
arguably exposing them to other civil liability."' Offensive
reasons, even if legitimate, might incite the jury's disapproval
Wary of the ambiguous or vague, fearful of the embarrassing or offensive, the employer might seek vindication based on
circumstantial evidence. Members of the protected class might
represent a disproportionately high percentage of the
employer's work force. The workplace relationship between the
employer and the plaintiff, if congenial or supportive, might
tend to counter charges of discrimination. The employer or the
manager charged with making the challenged employment
decision might be a member of the protected class." One can
imagine numerous circumstantial facts that might serve the
employer reluctant to rely on the reasons for the challenged action. The jury might reject these facts. It might infer discrimination from the employer's failure to explain its conduct. It
might, on the other hand, find the indirect evidence persuasive, particularly if the plaintiffs case is borderline. Although
the employer's circumstantial evidence might disprove discrimination to the jury's satisfaction, it is, unless supported by a
formally articulated reason, legally insufficient.

" See O'Leary, supra note 9, at 837.
=5 See Samp, supra note 64, at 16 (positing that an employer might conzeal
that it fired an employee in violation of a labor agreement).
- See Ricks, 113 S. Ct. at 2750.

BROOKLYNLAWREVIEW

[Vol. 61: 703

D. Pervasive Disadvantages
The three-stage, burden-shifting McDonnell Douglas
scheme, beset with burdens of production and persuasion, a
rebuttable presumption, and strictures on acceptable forms of
proof has afflicted the federal judiciary with unabated turmoil.297 Subsequent explanations in Burdine and Hicks have
failed to allay the uncertainty and have engendered continued
debate among the circuit courts."'
One must sympathize with jurors who must make factual
determinations in elusive discrimination cases based on law
which continues to spark controversy among the judiciary.
Under the prevailing standard, the permissive pretext-only
rule, the McDonnell Douglas framework has degenerated into
a "useless ritual." 9 After the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the employer must articulate legitimate reasons
for his conduct.00 Then, rather than those reasons framing
the issues as logic suggests, the employee may present evidence of discrimination unrelated to the articulated reasons,
the employer may present any evidence to justify his conduct,
and the jury may search the record for justifications."0 ' Jurors must wonder why the judge instructs them to apply a selfcontradictory standard. They must question their understanding of the instructions. They must believe that they are somehow missing the point.
Even the word "pretext," as used in McDonnell Douglas
and explained in Hicks, is misleading. Although the word denotes subterfuge, the Supreme Court tells us that an employer
may indulge in an "innocent" pretext, one motivated by an
employer's uncertainty of why a manager fired a protected
employee. 0 ' This Orwellian redefinition of "pretext" will further confound the already mortally perplexed.

See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
" See supra notes 58-76, 129-133 and accompanying text.

2 Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2761 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Essary, supra note
3, at 423.
"' Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
001 Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2765 (Souter, J., dissenting).

..
2 Id. at 2764 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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CONCLUSION

There is some solace in the hope (perhaps the inevitability)
that nonplussed jurors, regardless of McDonnell Douglas, will
revert to their common sense and decide cases based on whether they think the employer discriminated. But the evidentiary
distortions of the McDonnell Douglas scheme will hinder their
deliberations. In rejecting the pretext-only rule, Hicks has
eliminated any slender justification for retaining the
McDonnell Douglas scheme. Too many courts, claiming to
follow Hicks, grant employers summary judgment in cases
presenting factual questions for a jury." Confusion is averted at the cost of justice.
Revamping the approach is not the solution. A system
with flaws so pervasive and serious eludes even the most laborious efforts at repair. Early optimism must surrender to proof
of failure. The Supreme Court should discard the McDonnell
Douglas scheme and supplant it with the motivating-factor
test. Civil rights litigants would then face the serviceable
practices applicable in all civil cases. Unfettered by formalism,
they would devise a strategy and present the evidence. The
jury would decide whether the plaintiff has proven that illegal
discrimination motivated the adverse employment decision.
The defendant would then have the opportunity to limit the
remedy by proving that it would have taken the same action
based on a legitimate reason.c 4 After twenty years of disarray, sense would be restored to circumstantial employment
discrimination cases.

' See supra notes 203-218 and accompanying text. But cce Malau4 cupra
note 10, at 2305 (arguing that some courts erroneously interpret Hicks to foreclose
summary judgment for employers once the case reaches the pretext stage).
.. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)0B) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).

